MCScott in
post #1496 (his/her first) which was delayed and may have been missed, ends by stating -
- It is easy to identify accidents related to failures of automated flight systems, or the misuse thereof. It is impossible to track accidents avoided by such systems. The overall statistics, which seem to show fewer and fewer accidents per air mile traveled, suggest that [if] automation is either a net safety benefit, or it is being overwhelmed by other safety improvements. I have no data to say one way or another.
So that is the crux of the matter. It is only when something gets completely outside the "envelope" that the statistic is generated. In the safety manual, there is no such thing as a "near miss", as a "near miss" is an accident that was avoided through timely and proper intervention. The human ~ automation interface is where the problem actually lies. In other words, how far can you let automation extend the envelope without placing the human in the loop?
BTW, the brackets around the "if" in the quote are mine, and apologies to MCScott "if" it was intended otherwise.
mm43