Hello Fitter!
welcome to the world of deterrence.
Already familiar with it, thanks.
Actually, with your post, we are discussing two different elements of deterrence. You are referring to the risk of unknown versus the demonstrated capability as a deterrent. I was quizzing Trim about demonstrated capability (and indirectly, deterrence).
A deterrent demonstrated, for example a functional ICBM system, is a different sort of deterrent issue than
"How many n-bombs do Pakistan have, and are they missile or aircraft delivered?" being mulled over in India's Defense Ministry (to offer but a single example).
The key is uncertainty - if the other side knows what you have, and what you will do, they can plan.
That isn't all that has to do with deterrence, which deals in the combination of certainty, uncertainty, and risk assessment. The Israeli deterrent, writ large, is the known (public secret?) functional strategic nuke capability. We can probably assume a tactical air delivered capability as well, or maybe that has been confirmed.
The risk assessment in Tehran over functional maritime tactical nuke capability (submarine launched Cruise Missile Nukes, call it a Kosher TLAM(N) if you like) can be assumed, or confirmed,
without much change in general planning. What I was bothering Trim about was
his appearing to convert an assumption into a fact, which requires evidence. If there is evidence of such, I'd be interested to know.
If not, then sense always dictates that they don't do anything to provoke a response far worse than they can tolerate.
Respectfully, no, they simply deal in a different risk assessment and mitigation, regardless of whether we assume them rational (in varying degrees) or not.
I'll offer to you that the confirmation of a Kosher TLAM(N) program / capability is a far more effective deterrent than an assumption of one. As Israel are still not in the NPT, they have no political loss in their own confirmation of capability ... if that seems to them a stronger deterrent.
I'll leave as an exercise for the reader the operational puzzle of how do deploy the 212's to use a cruise missile in a nuclear strike ... which consideration may inform the Iranian acquisition of two Russian SAM systems: the infamous S300, and the TOR-M1 point defense suite previously acquired.