Singapurcanac, for the 3rd or 4th time, you completely miss the point. All your points are completely irrelevant, because they are NOT supposed to work according to ICAO rules. Ever heard about GAT and OAT? They are simply working according to regulations applied by relevant authority. Again:
-No TL - what's your point here? It doesn't have to be on RT if it's known from other sources, and anyway they are cleared to a height based on local pressure, so they know they are below TL.
-there is approach clearance - not in ICAO phraseology, but they are cleared for 3rd and 4th turn in the pattern depicted on a chart, and that's enough for them.
-no word identified - why would they be? He's not APS, and we don't know what type of radar service he provides. And again, he's not an ICAO controller. BTW, previous sector had him identified, so local rules may specify that after a handoff from one radar unit to another no identification is required, because it was permanent, and that's perfectly ok.
-PAR app by unqualified soldier - and exactly how do you know he's unqualified for PAR? Just because he has no ICAO licence? Hundreds of mil controllers worldwide do it daily without an ICAO/FAA endorsement, and you wouldn't call them unqualified.
-is it PAR at all? Not really
-sending to another freq for landing clearance is not always required, it may be provided on the same frequency as approach services.
And anyway, that's not what killed them. At no point they seem to feel unease with the ATC, as they were accustomed to it. What killed them was knowingly (and it was planned) busting minima looking for ground contact.
Grizzled - in the complete CVR, 3 persons are in cockpit at different times. 1st one is chief purses, which is of course quite normal. Then it's one of the President's minister - he's informed conditions are bad and they will probably have to go somewhere else. After some time he informs the crew "the President hasn't yet decided", but the rest of his statement is marked as unclear, so we don't know what the decision was supposed to be about. The last one was Polish Air Force general - he stayed there until the crash, but there is almost no interaction between him and the crew, he rather seems to be reading something (approach chart) aloud to himself.
Rubik - they earlier discuss their approach planning, and it seems they PLAN to disregard any TAWS warning - "we will be ok as long as Zietas (navigator) reads out our height".
Gwillie - this statement was early in the CVR, about 40 minutes before the crash, while still at FL330 over Minsk. It sounds ominous, but is rather irrelevant to further outcome.