A critical point for consideration in this accident might be the differences in performance between the A330 and the previous types the crew may have been familiar with. A substantial difference between what they were historically used to and what they actually experienced could have had a great heightening effect on the sensation of the pitch up illusion if that is what occurred.
Another point is:
"How often does the average pilot do a sudden unexpected TOGA go-round at light-weight having just lost visual? Is not the physiological aspect of sudden light-weight acceleration at TOGA a bit disconcerting?"
It's quite a different kettle of fish doing a missed approach when already
on the clocks from DA or MDA - to transitioning from an unexpected lost visual into a missed approach/go-round scenario. Certainly that's so in the simulator and most certainly in the airplane - the difference being that you can't reproduce the vestibular sensations in the simulator.
If you search the internet for the topic you'll find that the onset of the pitch-up illusion is sudden and alarming. The pilot response of pitching nose-down strongly reinforces the "sensation of steeply climbing" illusion. i.e. once you're in it you're unlikely to escape it.
Back in the 1970's, after observing a number of glider winch-launch accidents in VMC where the pilots pitched sharply nose-down just after transitioning to a steep nose-up climb, the famous UK gliding instructor Derek Piggot wrote a book on the subject, citing the many instances, and an avmed analysis of the phenomenon.
Those who haven't had avmed training, as with hypoxia, wouldn't stand a chance once in the grip of the sensation. The "stuffing the nose down" response is quite involuntary. If the other pilot wasn't suffering the same illusion at first, once the unload came on, he soon would be.
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