Hamish.
I think you are right about there being shades of Kegworth, but there are many significant differences.
The report has to use a lot of circumstantial evidence but it seems to suggest that a bearing failure on the (ACM) Air Cycle Machine caused significant vibration. The engine displays do not have VIB gauges, so trying to figure out the problem was always going to be difficult.
The ACM speed has a direct link to the engine thrust, so when a thrust lever was retarded, it probably led to a decrease in vibration. Confirmation bias possibly and R engine shutdown.
As the thrust on the L engine was reduced to enter the circuit, the fuel cutoff lever may have moved into the "cutoff" position due to the missing / failed rivet that allowed the lever to travel thought the cutoff gate unimpeded.
Double engine failure. Emergency checklist for double engine failure could have been clearer as attempts to start the 2nd engine too soon after a start attempt on the 1st results in the starters disengaging on both engines. If sufficiently accelerated the 1st engine may start (but at a slower rate) and the 2nd engine will have to be attempted again. It is suggested that a start could take 85sec to achieve a start to a point where full power would be available.
These guys seemed to have got the engines started, but the thrust available was not sufficient to power them out of the very low altitude they found themselves at (approx 100' below airfield level)
The report seem to emphasise the importance of flying at the best lift/drag speed to achieve the optimal time and distance available for dealing with the problem.
All in all these guys found themselves in a difficult position which then got worse & worse. I agree that shutting down an engine when not 100% certain is very questionable; but the report could only guess at what symptoms they were presented with that led them to that decision.
T'Bug