HN39,
Me: “Considering the BEA has not reported tell-tale signs of extreme dynamic pressure to the tail fin (V/S) and flying controls retrieved so far, one must assume that the descent TAS at lower altitudes would have been considerably lower than 600kt.”
HazelNuts39: “Chris, what 'tell-tale signs' do you have in mind?”
Neither a structures man, nor an accident investigator, I am admittedly making at least two layman’s assumptions: that there would be tell-tale signs; and that the BEA would have no reason not to report them. So it’s what they have NOT said that leads me to infer that the aeroplane was not flown at, say, more than 100kts over VMO. Like yourself, I haven’t got access to the FCOM at present, but no doubt the VMO is below 400kt (about 350?). For the purpose of crude argument, such as mine, precise figures are pointless.
Quotes from Interim Report No.2:
“[caption to photo] Upper surface of left-hand inboard aileron with the fittings attaching it to the wing aft spar: failure due to the bottom-upward loads applied on the aileron [at impact].”
“On the right-hand elevator, four of the seven [attachment] fittings were present. They had bottom-upwards deformations.”
“The vertical stabilizer was in generally good condition. The damage to the side panels was largely due to the recovery… These observations indicate that [the V/S] was subjected to a load greater than 120,000N in the rudder’s hinge axis.”
So the condition of the various flight-control surfaces recovered is apparently not worthy of comment. The tail-fin damage is impact-only, bottom-upwards.
Bonne fête!
Bearfoil,
Most of the arguments here are based on the BEA report, and some on their provisional “Findings” (there are no “Conclusions” in their Interim Reports). That does not necessarily mean that we accept all of them unreservedly, or that the BEA will not amend − if and where necessary − in the light of further evidence. But we need some of you to play devil’s advocate!
Chris