CaptainMidnight
By the look at your post#1052 on the other thread, NAS rears its head again, you seem to think do-it-yourself calling-in-the-blind radio procedures in G are safer than having ATC in a tower actually controlling circuit area and runway traffic.
It would be great if this was the truth, however it is not so.
What many pilots don’t seem to understand is that the chance of colliding with another aeroplane thirty miles away from an aiport is many thousands of times less than the chance of colliding with an aircraft in the circuit area or on the runway. That’s why non-radar towers throughout the world have very small amounts of airspace.
For example, in the USA it’s generally 4.3 miles radius 2,500 feet AGL. In the UK, the non-radar towers are generally two nautical miles radius and 2,000 feet.
At first thought it may seem that by making the airspace larger for the Controller that safety will be improved. Airspace safety experts from around the world who I have spoken to do not agree with this, and this is supported by the fact that our busy airports such as Bankstown, Moorabbin and Parafield have very small control zones.
Whenever I’ve spoken to FAA or UK airspace experts, they claim that non-radar towers should be responsible for a small amount of airspace so the ATC can concentrate where the collision risk is greater. Generally speaking, they say that by increasing the area and having overflying traffic calling or being involved in the ATC system will reduce safety as it dissipates the attention of the Controller from where it really matters.
Walley2
On this particular Broome issue I’ve spoken to a retired FAA ATC who resides on the west coast of the USA and is very much involved with Australia. His belief is that safety will certainly be decreased if the airspace is increased in size when compared with what has evolved with the US NAS.
Yes, it may work for a number of months or years. But one day, if the Controller’s attention is taken away from the circuit traffic because a VFR aircraft calls fifteen miles away when transiting, this will be the day when the accident happens and people are killed.
Of course there is a chance of a collision in the link airspace, however industry experience over decades with millions of flights shows that the chance of a collision in E airspace above D is incredibly small. That’s the only reason the US does not have a transponder requirement for VFR aircraft in E airspace over D where there is no radar coverage. About 50% of their 350 Class D aerodromes have no radar coverage in the E airspace immediately above the D. The reason they have told me that they have not introduced a mandatory transponder requirement for VFR so TCAS can be more effective in airline aircraft is that they have not experienced those types of accidents – they say most of their accidents involving airline aircraft are CFIT.
Walley2 of course, if your study shows that there is a measurable risk in the link airspace above 2,500 feet, then I will totally support putting in a proper system to minimise that risk. Of course, that needs to be Class C with a terminal radar facility. Anything less would be next to useless because the Controller would not know where the VFR aircraft was located (ie. “I’m over the 28th sandhill about 15 miles to the east heading north”).
Of course there is a cost increase with this, but I’m sure you as the airport owner would never put profits before passenger safety.