Nothing more military "smart" than to watch elevators, ailerons, flaps, and rudders wake up and come to attention on deck, eh?
Point being proper Rudder deployment depends on hydraulics being servicable, and any controllers working quickly, and properly. With RTLU FAIL, one pictures a wide range of deflection not in concert with airspeed. Hence the warning. In AL II this a/c has few protections, and without visibility and instruments, how does one meter Rudder input? That Rudder stops failed was a follow on to loss of airspeeds, there may be nothing more to the saga, but the laterally imposed damages to the Rudder's mountings needs to be addressed. These findings of the BEA are in reverse, an unwinding from demonstrables at recovery. My mentioning these areas doesn't explain away anything, but the fact that they exist suggest an expansion may be necessary.
The spoiler is not shown in the BEA report, yet there are several excellent pictures of it in the thread. This panel was beaten to death, I suppose from its extension into an extreme airstream. Looking at the entire view of the 330 and the severed and found pieces suggests the loss was of mostly control surfaces. Nothing unusual about that, however it is suggestive of an out of control a/c at high speed, attempting to slow and regain controllability. My understanding is that at ALII controls are free to deflect to their stops; why would it be impossible for a pilot to attempt recovery, but without feedback make a hash of it?
This aircraft was out of control at maximum altitude, losing its energy to alight in the ocean as described challenges reason.