BOAC;
By the evidence of its destruction, the gear was likely down; the main gear oleos are fragmented, tires are broken off and have lost their pressure.
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For others, if the aircraft was indeed on the approach to 09, the gear would have been down at this point, (normally extended between 1500' and 2500' or about 5 to 8km from the runway to stay within stabilized approach criteria).
I think once touchdown/impact had occurred as evidenced in the sand, engine power and/or control position and forces would have been largely ineffective. The engines would have swallowed a lot of sand and other debris; - the structure would be responding to variations in the terrain and the obstacles such as trees. Where the structure was in contact with the terrain, the drag offered by such contact would far outweigh any ability of the control surfaces to overcome. Once ground contact was made, the engines would have been inoperative.
As seen in an early video before they were moved to the highway, (where they are seen in the composite), the wing on the left in that early video is almost certainly upside down as evidenced by the spoiler panels seen on the bottom of the structure. I can't tell with the other wing but to me it looks correctly oriented, (top of the wing, up).
FWIW, I don't think the slightly-south track of the approach, being interpreted here as "off-course", has much to do with this accident.
RetiredF4, thanks again for the link to this video.
411A;
What's even more important, why was the aircraft off course, to the right?
Runway 09 at TIP is served by a very accurate NDB approach...two beacons as I recall.
A simple exercise...provided of course, the pilots were at a reasonable proficient level.
The Jepps show the two NDBs; the approach would have been straightforward, I agree.
That said, it all depends upon how the approach was being conducted and what was both available to the crew and what was used. I get the sense that this was an experienced, veteran crew although we do not yet know what experience they had on the A330, (the airplane was new but perhaps they had a background...we don't know).
The range of choices for the approach is a full, looking-outside visual to a fully-managed non-precision approach using the FMGEC and autoflight system.
The former (a visual) can be done close in as you know, even with a large aircraft and the requisite 'hands'; the latter, computer-based, autoflight-conducted approach requires more airspace (distance) to stabilize and do its LNAV/VNAV work properly.
An "early" descent (below FAF altitude before the FAF) cannot be ruled out either on a visual or using "Selected-selected", (which just means using heading/VS or track/FPA on the autopilot), especially if visibility was locally reduced. An early descent likely wouldn't occur using fully managed as both track and crossing altitudes are flown by the autoflight system. Requirements or restrictions on its use, and training and experience will be the focus here.
PJ2