wasp9;
With all due respect PJ2, despite you choosing to call yourself "Flight Safety Specialist & Consultant" you are doing just that.
Not that I have any problem with that. Some of your comments and thoughts are actually very good indeed. I would expect however that someone involved in Flight Safety does not automatically, or by "feeling", rule out cultural factors, cockpit gradient, training and other valid points brought up by a number of pilots that actually operate in Libya. (not talking about the KL pilot that flew there 12 times...).
Why is it that speculations on the hard factor are apparently allowed on this forum but information on the soft factor is considered finger pointing, politically incorrect or even racism...?
By the way, speculation (estimation part of assessment) is part of any normal accident investigation process. For all those here thinking that only the DFDR & CVR will provide the answers; Think outside the box (literally) and invest some time in, for instance, an SMS course or better, accident investigation (Tripod etc.)
My thanks for your comments.
I chose to join the conversation because the wild speculations and conspiracy theories began to dwindle and some serious discussion was becoming possible.
If the impression gained by any of my remarks is that I "rule out cultural factors, cockpit gradient, training", etc, then I have been mis-communicating in all previous posts on other threads; One cannot discount such factors at all. In this particular case I didn't think that there was sufficient information upon which to base a serious discussion; nor was there in the Turkish/AMS accident although some tried.
It is a known, statistical fact, (as you'll be well aware) that the aviation accident and fatality rate for Africa is the highest, compared against other areas of the world. My view, to clarify, is, what cannot be accepted
as a universal, is an assessment of competency (or lack of) based purely upon nationality or race. Comments offered by "those who operate there, (Libya) are of an anecdotal nature and may or may not reflect relevant factors in this accident. I made the comment 144 posts into the dialogue (May 12th, perhaps the one you're referencing), that "
I don't get the feeling that this outcome had anything to do with the airport, the navaids, ATC or the country the accident occurred in." I still think that, but it is clear from others' posts that this sense of things is not shared universally. The truth or falsity of such statements is, for an accident investigation, not particularly relevant. However, cultural elements are relevant, (though we don't know if that is so here), as evidenced in the extensive historical literature on same. The matter is subtle; the line between 'pc' and honest, frank commentary is not necessarily fixed.
I don't think it is possible to discuss things such as cockpit gradient, training or CRM at the moment because, without knowledge of those things as they relate directly to this accident, that IS mere speculation without foundation; such discussion is not, '
not allowed'...it is just not possible to have it because, (though some such as yourself may know), we don't know anything about these issues yet as they relate to Afriqiyah, the crew involved or the safety culture of the airline. By many accounts, the comments have been highly complementary of the crew, not critical.
Establishing the pathway to the accident, how the aircraft was flown in the minutes before the accident, assessing such from the many excellent photographic contributions, are the primary goals right now, and inform the present discussion. I never considered that comments regarding nationality, the country involved, the character observations were helpful in understanding what happened. I think it is reasonable to expect that at some point, when more is known about the 'softer' factors, that discussion will, and should, take place, likely in the report.
The question regarding the airport and the airport's navaids as well as ATC do not, (for me) seem key points in this accident. I say this
only because the A330, as you may know, programmed correctly through the FMGEC and autoflight system, is quite capable of executing a non-precision approach without the use of external navaids. The question has arisen regarding the permitted use of such technology, apparently either by the Libyan regulator or the airline, (can't recall which it was). But I have mentioned that a "Selected-Selected" approach, (meanin the use of Heading/VS-Track FPA) is a standard non-precision technique for the A320/A330/A340 series aircraft.
I can see both fatigue and the often-mentioned sun-in-the-eyes being factors to consider but we know nothing else except that which has been offered, once again, anecdotally. Having flown such approaches many times in all these types, I am not convinced of the relevance of either factor but that is just an opinion.
One thing I might add (and ask of others here) is, what did the wreckage pattern look like of the A330 flight test stall accident at Toulouse? Are there aerial photos available? The Afriqiyah accident has all the earmarks of a high-energy impact, but it may not necessarily have been a
high-speed event, so I think the question is an important one to ask in determining how the impact occurred.
Originally Posted by wasp9
Some posters here don't seem to realize that a possible pilot error does not automatically mean that the pilots are to blame. If well seasoned pilots here indicate training, CRM and safety culture as possible contributors then this is not to be seen as mud-slinging.
Absolutely the case; this is the essence of accident investigation when assessing human factors. Well stated.
kind regards,
PJ2