Airbus automatics and configuration details aside, it seems to me that the critical bad decision came about when the GF crew realized their original approach was not going to work. At that point they knew (because it was obvious) they were behind the aircraft, and yet they still had all the good options wide open ahead.
Even with the motive to avoid having an official 'missed approach' on the record, the decision to do a tight 360 close to the ground in pitch darkness seems unsupportable. As long as one is playing fantasy - land with the nomenclature, why not climb a few thousand feet and standardize the turn so there's time and room to improve the layup - or better yet, fly the MA Procedure anyway, to the letter, and just call it 'manoeuvering'?
In a more perfect world, the crew observation that Plan A had not worked should have inspired some moments of introspection and then a change to MORE conservative plan B requiring less artful manoeuvering and simpler procedure, rather than the increasingly nonstandard and uncontrolled flying that ensued.
When you abandon SOP, decisionmaking becomes a philosphical thing. At such times, one had better have the right philosophy.