SeniorDispatcher: I believe that we are in near complete agreement on this point. The FARs tend to define an information flow from dispatcher to PIC; while the reverse is not nearly as well defined, it seems clear that any information that will influence the opinion that the dispatcher is required to have under 121.533(c)(3) and 121.627(a) must be communicated. In any other case, the dispatcher’s opinion may not be fully informed, which prevents him/her from executing their regulatory responsibilities. Cell phones have made this incredibly easy.
My only critique is that I still believe that the PIC’s authority does indeed emanate from 91.3. I have pasted in a couple of opinions from the FAA Chief Counsel that I believe support this. Obviously, this is nitpicking, but I wouldn’t be the captain if I didn’t insist on having the last word! Anyway, for what it’s worth:
The term "pilot in command" is defined in Sec. 1.1(14 CFR 1.1) of the Federal Aviation Regulations as the "pilot responsible for the operation and safety of an aircraft during flight time". Consistently, Sec. 91.3(14 CFR 91.3) provides that "the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.” A second section, Sec. 91.9 (14 CFR 91.9) prohibits operation of an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. In general, Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations sets forth the general operating and flight rules that govern the operation of any aircraft. Furthermore, if the operation is of such a nature that it requires either a Part 121 or Part 135 certificate, Sec. Sec. 121.385(c) and 135.35 require designation of the pilot in command for the flight...
...Nothing in FAR 121.629, as amended, purports to change the responsibility for the operational control of the aircraft by the pilot in command or aircraft dispatcher as provided for under FAR 121.533 and 121.535 or other sections within the FAR. As the FAA stated in the preamble to the interim final rule, in response to your comments regarding the ultimate responsibility for takeoff, "nothing in this rule changes FAR 91.3(a) that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft." The responsibility of an airline dispatcher, as provided under FAR 121.533 and 121.535, includes "the joint responsibility for the preflight planning, delay and dispatch release of a flight, monitoring the progress of each flight, issuing necessary information for safety of flight, and canceling or redispatching a flight if a flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released." As amended, FAR 121.629 does not alter the aircraft dispatcher's responsibilities for operational control of aircraft under FAR 121.533 and 121.535.
411A: I may have mispoken; the company was not expecting me to actually land at BGBW. They were simply using it as a paper alternate to facilitate a non-ETOPS requirement. In the case I described, they then wanted to take advantage of being non-ETOPS to operate outside of the ETOPS MEL provisions. All quite legal, but that is the point of the discussion.
Since you have referenced Air Greenland’s 757 ops into BGBW, I thought I would offer some additional information for those who are unfamiliar with it.
At the time, the only available approach into BGBW was the NDB DME-1 into runway 7. This required a descent gradient from the MAP to the runway of 5.66 degrees. A go-around from below the MDA could be problematic with one engine inoperative, due to the serious obstacle issues and resulting climb gradients. Advisory Circular 120-29A stipulates that
A multiengine aircraft conducting a Category I or Category II instrument approach should be capable of safely executing a “one-engine-inoperative” go-around from any point in an approach prior to touchdown with the aircraft in a normal configuration, or specified non-normal configurations (e.g., engine out, if applicable)… In the rare event that operation out of a runway may not be possible following a rejected landing, then provision of suitable information on a “commit point,” or equivalent condition (e.g., limit weight, minimum speed, or suitable configuration) may instead be provided.
We were aware of Air Greenland’s 757 operation, and I had a pleasant exchange via email with their chief pilot. He stated that they consider the operation “difficult” and highly recommended specific simulator training since, in his words, “pilots often seem to find it difficult to meet the stabilized concept parameters”.
So without the limit weights, commit point, appropriate company procedures and specific simulator training, I would “prefer not” to go there in the middle of the night on one engine. Particularly since the airplane is, in all respects except for the final FAA program approval, ETOPS capable and thus quite able to lumber on over the Kef or Goose.