And what further problems would there have been by shutting down the 70% engine on short finals...Imagine the ECAMs at that critical stage of the flight? Im away and dont have the FCOMS handy, but why add to your problems at 500ft just to touch down 30kts (if that) slower? Lets be practical about this, there are lessons to be learned, and we have the advantage of sitting at our desks banging out how we woud have done this and that, but none of us were there, and none of us were under the tremendous stress the crew must have been under (dont forget, both engines had just rolled back to idle at Limes). How can you argue with no fatalities and no hull loss? A few burst tires and a bit of a fire on the brakes? And just at what point do you shut down that engine? 500ft, 300ft, 50ft? I for one think the crew did a magnificent job with all the information available. Ive flown with the Captain and he is a sharp cookie and a very nice bloke, and I note there are posters here questioning his command skills relating to his age and experience, I can assure you, the Cathay command course is no walk in the park.
It amazes me the posters here, probably half not even professional pilots, less with Airbus experience, and even less again having flown in the region, questioning the actions of this crew, even to the point to taking cheap shots at the pilots reputation attached to working for Cathay.
Its a bit redundant to now ask if we had similar ECAMS if we would continue, knowing now what we do, but give the crew credit for a job very well done and by all means, learn from this incident, but dont try to hang this crew on a job well done in conditions most of us will never experience. Its quite frankly insulting to professional pilots worldwide.
Nosey