Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[tucumseh]

Robin & Chug

If I may add something.

If an error was made inputting data to the RNS252 (SuperTANS) that, indeed, would be construed as a "pilot error", but not Gross Negligence; however any decent lawyer would quote the Release To Service in mitigation.

First, the RNS252 is one of the few Nav systems even mentioned in the RTS, implying (a) the rest were removed during conversion or, more likely, (b) Boscombe simply were not given the time to establish the installed performance (as required by the regs), so were correct in not mentioning the kit in their report; thus avoiding any confusion as to status. They accompanied this progress report with a clear statement that the aircraft was not to be released. Note - a progress report, not formal CA Release Recommendations, as required by Controller Aircraft (Sir Donald Spiers at the time) before he can sign the CAR. He signed anyway, the first act of Gross Negligence. That is, he ignored his own regulations (CA Instructions, the published orders taught to all aircraft and equipment project managers stating how JSP553 and other legal obligations were to be implemented), thus establishing a dangerous precedent.


Second, there is no level of clearance stated. Again, a clear breach of the same regulations. However, the RTS does, erroneously, say the RNS252 may be used but warns (MoD's highlighting);


GPS has not yet been declared operational (at Initial Operating Capability) by the US Department of Defense and accuracy is therefore not guaranteed to any level. Even when GPS is declared operational by the US (advised to aircrew AFTER the accident), accuracy of the GPS could degrade substantially without any indications to the crew. For this reason, GPS should not be used as the sole navigation aid.


The RTS then lists a raft of caveats, including "the (GPS) ERROR message is meaningless" and GPS is "highly susceptible to jamming".

It also says the accuracy of the Doppler/INS system "on trial" was "2.81% of distance travelled, overland, with a recently harmonised INS". This of course is rendered academic because (a) they had just flown over water and (b) the Doppler and INS were not cleared for use anyway! That implies the trials were incomplete when CAR and RTS were signed, and still incomplete at the time of the accident.


I don't like using car analogies, but this is akin to senior officers (CA, DGA2 and ACAS) saying "We're not going to bother ascertaining if the car works, but you are ordered to drive it anyway. Oh, and by the way, the steering doesn't work if you try to make a turn, we're not providing you with a means of knowing where you are and if you complain you will receive a career brief on your brief career". Which rather nicely sums up what we know happened.

The above is fact, but I will offer this opinion. I firmly believe the above Gross Negligence, including ACAS's act of signing the laughably non-compliant RTS in contravention of the regulations, influenced the subsequent actions of Wratten, Day and Graydon.