RAT 5 -
I think it is fairly well appreciated that a devious sim instructor could conjure up any number of failures that could result in a pilot losing his/her S.A. - but there is a very real trap in that doing so introduces the possibility of negative training. I too have had the pleasure of a failue of the air/ground system in a 73-3 sim - the fundamental shortfall of this scenario being the complete absense in your bowels (and ears) that something is VERY wrong with the pressurisation system. In the Helios situation - a typical (but unpressurised) 737 with typical ROC - these visceral clues SHOULD be ringing alarm bells independently of anything Mr Boeing has fitted. They certainly have with me - in stark contrast to what happens in the sim. An experienced pilot might say this is a perfect example of where one has to follow ones gut instinct.
Nevertheless, you raise many very valid points. There are a number of issues here not confined to the aviation industry, and we must work not to let them make our business less safe (like negative sim training). Most pertinently, because the powers and responsibilities of the Commander of an aircraft essentially have their roots in old maritime law, they were not written with the concept of a gratuitously litigious society and law profession in mind. In other words, as you have alluded to, we (and our employers) are far too ripe a target for the avaricious and/or political not to have a pop at. We either need to modify these old laws so that we do not bear responsibility absolute for everything that happens on our flights, or we need to have a bullet-proof get-out-of-jail-free clause that admits the possibility of "honest" human falibility on the flight deck and decriminalises it. The later, of course, still does not negate the possibility of civil lawsuit, hence we really should be carrying professional insurance, like many in the medical profession.
There are parallels here with AF447 inasmuch as design philosphy with Airbus worked towards decreasing the motor-skill levels required to fly the aeroplane, thereby (theoretically) decreasing the likelyhood of mis-handling leading to an accident. But, in accordance with the law of diminishing returns, the human use-it-or-lose-it skill trait in itself introduces a risk that must be carefully balanced. Broadly, AF447 came unstuck because of this and, paradoxically, one other important element of flight safety - a decision of judgement. I cannot see how a manufacturer can design a system that is perfectly fool-proof, 100% safe, and able to accomodate every possible scenario and variable that international passenger air transport involves. There will always be judgement calls to be made and systems that need setting and monitoring, and at least some of that stuff can only be done in-situ .
W.R.T. your other observations, I wholeheartedly agree - the processes of accident investigation, and of judicial process, must be kept very separate. This is clearly not happening in many (most) countries at present and I can't see it changing in a hurry. I suggest whilst we as a profession try to get our laws re-written, we reflect upon what it entails to be a skilled pilot, and what value we place on experience.