Of course, PLovett, but therein lies the problem. It was not just the Helios crew that were 'confused'. You need to read the whole previous thread to understand the psychology involved in why quite a few 'competent' crews had mis-diagnosed the warning as well over the years of the 737. It was not until post-Helios that this became an established teaching point and the subject of a notice from Boeing. Even then it IS possible to have the TOCW sound in the air given certain failures - see other thread.
I do recommend that those joining in here should visit that original thread. You will see there that while they were the final flawed link it was not just the 'crew' that contributed to the accident - there were many failings along the way elsewhere, including the question as to why the Captain had been employed in the first place with his 'record'. Why did the cabin crew not respond earlier? Why was the panel left incorrectly configured. Indeed a classic 'Swiss Cheese'.