Hi,
In french:
Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien
Google give this :
That the loss or inconsistency speeds measured results of multiple failures of several aircraft systems that seriously affect the operation of the aircraft. This is a serious incident that must be brought to the attention of the BEA
· That the loss or inconsistency of measured speeds can cause the aircraft outside its flight envelope and can be the cause of crashes
· What December 1995, Airbus has noted a lack of certification on pitot probes
· What about September 2007, EASA has noted the lack of certification of Pitot probes
· What about September 2007, EASA has noted the absence in the cockpit of a specific alarm "blocking Pitot"
· What about January 1999, the German BFU has recommended the amendment of the certification standards of Pitot probes
· That the procedure "IAS doubtful" applied by the crew of Air France recommends displaying thrust "Climb" which may cause the output of the flight
· That adherence to a false stall warning, as this may be the case when a blockage of pitot probes, (applying TOGA thrust) may cause the output of the flight
That in the "FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL, Air France recognizes that the blockage of pitot probes may result in multiple A330 extreme situations and that the crew had never been trained
· That the DGCA has never issued any instructions or info operational security-blocking pitot probes
· That TEMSI map presented to the crew of flight AF 447 shows a clear path to the point TASIL while the area is the busiest
· That A 741 447 AF offered a passage through the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) over the A 873 reached
· That Air France does not provide maps observation satellites to crews
· That for many years, knew that the fluctuations or loss of information related to speed pitot probe could lead to the A330 outside its flight envelope at the crossing of affected areas of weather conditions such as those encountered in the ITCZ.
Air France · What therefore should have given instructions to his CCO increased surveillance flights during the passage of the ITCZ
That no information that could lead to a change of flight plan by the crew, was sent to AF 447 per CCO
That Air France · must prove that the 9 filings serious incidents precursors were addressed to the DGCA and the 9 corresponding RAS were sent to BEA!
That Air France · must prove that careful analysis of these nine serious incidents have been carried
That Air France · must prove that the lessons learned from the 9 serious incidents have been forwarded to the Authority
That Air France · must provide a list of corrective measures were taken following the analysis of these nine serious incidents
· That the DGCA has to prove that the RAS serious incidents related precursors pitot probes from Air France, Air Caraibes Atlantique and elsewhere have been included in time in the database ECCAIRS.
· That the DGCA should list the measures taken following the receipt of ASR serious incidents pitot probes from Air France, Air Caraibes Atlantic and elsewhere.
· The BEA has not issued any report or any recommendations about safety incidents related to serious pitot probes that occurred prior to the accident of flight AF 447.
That no safety study on incidents Pitot probes have been conducted by the BEA before the accident flight AF 447!
· That EASA should produce the studies about the events leading to the accident of flight AF 447 and the recommendations or actions.
· Airbus must give reasons for a further reduction of the interval between two cleaning pitot probes has not been recommended
· That inconsistency of measured speeds resulting from blockage of pitot probe is an "unsafe condition" that can cause victims usually with the destruction of the plane!
· That the "unsafe condition" may lead pilots to excessive workload which does not allow them to perform their tasks accurately or to complete them.
° As the date of the accident, the loss of primary information transmission is considered a risk "hazardous" in the documentation for the certification (CS25).
· That class yet EASA cases of inconsistency in measured speeds lower risk "major" in the safety analysis that describes the failure conditions associated.
· That the ice crystals occur in 40% of icing and heating the pitot probes requires so much energy to evaporate the ice crystals.
· That the publication of an airworthiness directive also called "airworthiness directive" is only intended to correct an "unsafe condition".
· A precautionary measure resulting in the issuance of a SAFETY INFORMATION BULLETIN (SIB)
· How to remove the pitot probe Thales AA, EASA issued an AD and not a SIB and that therefore there was indeed an "unsafe condition" that required a response.
· That EASA has claimed he was simply a precautionary measure to allay public
· That is curious to note that if EASA, Airbus, the DGAC and the BEA does not officially qualify the case of inconsistency speeds measured by the pitot probes "unsafe conditions"
· That the FAA, however, does not hesitate to do so.
· What about November 2009, EASA has edited the document "certification specifications, for wide Aeroplanes (CS-25) and that now, loss of all information transmission (primary and backup) is a risk of" Catastrophic "
Let · asked pilots to accommodate the failure of the pitot probes and ensure the accountability of an "unsafe condition" by applying a checklist so that it defined as an "unsafe condition "may lead the crew in distress or physical overload which does not allow it to perform its tasks with precision or their completion.
· That equipment must operate an aircraft throughout its flight envelope
Pitot probes · That does not work properly in some of the flight: in the presence of ice crystals.
· That it appears that neither BEA nor the DGAC or EASA, neither Airbus nor Air France have taken account of the "unsafe condition" that is blocking the pitot probes.