safeware
We speak from same page.
As has been noted, the regs, rules and instructions have been for many years contradictory and sometimes downright confusing.
Who does what part of airworthiness/safety/fitness for purpose? The MoD were embarrassed into not being able to answer the question at the C130 inquest - and I could sympathise (up to a point!).
In system integration terms this is a boundary definition and control issue. What often happens in MoD is that a rule or organisational change will shift the boundary of responsibility to remove a responsibilty from one person, but there is no complementary shift (or financial provision) to make sure the gap is closed. These gaps are numerous, and each constitutes a risk. If you are lucky, this simply manifests it self as a delay - but increasingly the result is more serious. Very often it doesn't matter who does the job, as long as it is done properly, on time and efficiently. The problem arises when no-one polices this from on high to ensure the gaps don't exist. They used to liken this to a roof of interlocking tiles. For 20 years the MoD have systematically removed the tiles, the rain has got in and rotted the foundations.