What recommendations from the reviewing officer re the Tornado/Patriot BOI? In what context was the recommendation previously twice made? To whom? Why was it not acted upon?
As I said before, there were other factors in that crash, but a Reviewing Officer recommended that IFF failure warnings be integrated into the cockpit. He doesn't say which ones were missing (or not integrated properly) but the report confirms modification action is in hand. If such safety related warnings are not presented to the crew, the functional safety of the aircraft has not been assured. It is a feature of Safety Management in MoD that physical safety is usually addressed reasonably well, but functional safety is often ignored.
As for context, Boscombe identified the general problem (failure, and subsequent flat refusal to integrate failure warnings) in 1998 (perhaps before, not sure) and specifically on another platform. Under the same programme the same IFF was being fitted to a Tornado variant and a recommendation was made to have all other aircraft installations, but especially Tornado, inspected for correct installation. This was made at the time, and later in 2001 to,
inter alai, two Directors General / Executive Directors in PE/DPA as well as the project offices involved.
I'm afraid you'll have to ask them why they did not act. One reason given to me was "It worked on the bench, so it'll work in the aircraft" - which is a typical response to why system integration obligations are waived. The failure to act was the subject of a complaint to CDP (4 Star) who, in 1998, twice ruled that it was perfectly acceptable to deliver the aircraft in this state, and pay off the contract in the full knowledge that it was not fit for purpose. I say twice, because he was asked to reconsider as it was suspected he'd just had a lackey write the first reply.
I am but a pleb in the great machine and they must have had good reason. But, whatever that may be, it perfectly illustrates the complete ambivalence toward the subjects of safety, airworthiness and fitness for purpose. The point I make is that this, and many other examples, meant that the Haddon-Cave report and the vast majority of his recommendations came as no surprise whatsoever. This multitude of warnings throughout the 90s should have served to highlight, at the highest level, a systemic failing which has brought parts of the MoD to its knees in the last few years.
The above example is but a single step away from the main topic on this thread - lack of currency, training etc. On that subject, the BoI did not address whether or not the simulator was at the same build standard as the aircraft; but the programme I mentioned certainly did NOT modify the simulators. That is also a common safety failing.
Hope this helps.