Peter
I have just listened to your interview with Glenn Pew on AvWeb:
The Crash of BA038
Two things struck me about your interview:
1. Your command decision to leave John as PF while you took command of the situation was outstanding, and clearly led to the next decision which saved a worse outcome.
2. Your command decision, devoid of any procedural or sim justification, to go F25 has been vindicated as resulting in a far better outcome than hitting the ILS antenna.
Your description of your 6 secs of aircraft checks that led to the decision to go F25 demonstrates true Command skill. You gave yourself thinking time from a broader perspective.
Reading that, my thoughts turned to AA965 on 20Dec1995; the B757 that hit terrain at night after a botched approach to Cali, Columbia. Although the FO, who was PF and equally as experienced on the B757 as the Capt, the report stated "Although the accident flightcrew articulated misgivings several times during the approach, neither pilot displayed the objectivity necessary to recognize that they had lost situation awareness and effective CRM."
Interpreted, this suggests the Capt failed to look at the whole situation and recognise the flight as having departed a whole set of criteria required to continue the approach. Once the GPWS sounded and the FO executed the escape manoeuvre, he appears not to have done what you did in scanning and ensuring the aircraft configuration was optimal. He missed the air brakes still being extended. The aircraft impacted 250 feet below the top of the ridge. As with the AAIB, the report could not speculate on the outcome had they been retracted in time, other than to say "Because the B-757 flight simulators could not be back driven during the tests, it could not be determined with precision whether the airplane would have missed the mountain/tree tops if the speedbrakes had been retracted during the escape attempt." We are all left to guess that outcome. It is one of multiple events during their approach where "if only if..."
And that "if only" comes back to the Captain exercising command overview, rather than getting buried in the operating mode.
Peter, I chose the AA965 example simply to illustrate that your command of BA38 that day was exemplary, and will be studied by pilots for years to come. Not necessarily for any heroics, or piloting skills, but for the subtle, professional, skilled SITUATIONAL MANAGEMENT you demonstrated.
Sir, I tip my hat to you, and wish you a productive, happy future, now that you have given yourself the opportunity to play a far larger and more important role than as "just another" Captain (not said with any disrespect).
Now you can pass on experience, perspective, and inspiration to many more people in a broader cross-section of skills development, and make a bigger (and deservedly more remunerative) contribution as a result. I am sure you will have new opportunities presented to you now ... having shifted your perspective from returning to airline Captaincy.
I have one question. Since that day, have you ever considered whether an alternate action could have been useful, i.e. after going F25, lowering the nose to gain speed, and then using ground effect to stretch the glide to the runway?
Sailplane pilots know the major increase in L/D achieved on "hangar flights" from the far end of the runway once at about a wingspan above the ground. Of course, this is way outside any airline or Boeing practice, or possibly even any study, but I wonder if you had been presented with a serious undershoot, whether you would have encouraged John to "lower the nose ...." ?
Sincere best wishes
