Some readers may not be aware that the RAF Puma has always had a signifcant deficiency compared with not only the standard variant at the time (1971) when it was introduced, but also subsequent "super" variants. Its fuel consumption per kg is high, and yet the MoD chose to remove a fuel tank at build to ensure the ac met the spec requiring it to lift 16 troops at MAUW. Thus the ac has always suffered from shorter legs/endurance than any other operational UK helo at full fuel. This by definition means that crews are very wary off "pushing it" as embarrassment is often not far away if there is no refuel point or tac bowser in the vicinity while on a demanding task. Although aux cabin tanks (of early) and modern standards have been available - it is not the standard fit for both operational and H&S reasons.
I agree with those threads that have praised the crew for making sensible airmanship decisons and being better safe than sorry. When you know you have got an incipient endurance problem no matter how good your preflight planning, and the weather hits, in the RAF Puma 1 you often have a limited endurance room for maneouvre. In my experience it is in the nature of SH that flexible and continuously updated decision making is required to balance operational success with optimum safety. Good captaincy, crew cooperation and airmanship are esential to this and from what I have read there is all of this behind this particular incident.
Cheers