89 steps,
Lets clear up a misconception. There is no such thing as ICAO airspace. There is an ICAO classification of airspace in which certain levels of ATS are provided. It is up to each countries regulator to determine where each classification is used.
Please reread my posts, I have referred to ICAO airspace classifications, not "ICAO airspace".
As for a few more misconceptions, perhaps we should have given the airspace classifications colour names or something other than anything that implies (in ICAO risk management terms) different "levels of safety". ie that A is safer than B etc.
The whole intent of the separation assurance standard is that all airspace is equally safe, with the level of CNS/ATM and airspace classification matched to the traffic levels. A smart country will not provide services more than needed to satisfy the risk management criteria --- and don't come the furfy that C is no more costly to run than E ---- it doesn't come out that way when ALL costs are included.
Perhaps that is why E airspace is so common around the world??
Would I be happy to operate HCap RPT in E, of course I would, and did for many years, and not limited to US/Canada, either.
Nor was much of the E radar, is is claimed by so many of you to be necessary. And by the way, in somewhat bigger aircraft than B737. Likewise, extensive operations, over many years, of the same aircraft in G and F (yes, F, used to be some around).
As to the Gibbs HC decision on "duty of care", which has been a staple of Civilair for years.
There is a most useful later HC decision which contains the best definition of "safe" of all the "legal" definitions I have read, which make it clear there is no such thing as "absolutely safety". Further that safe cannot mean "absolutely safe", but this case defines "safe" in very sensible risk management terms ----- and which make it quite clear that Government risk management policies (not limited to matters airspace) are lawful, when a bush lawyer's reading of the Gibbs decision suggests otherwise.
Without this latter decision, and some subsequent supporting decisions, the application of such as AS/NZ 4360 Risk Management standards in Australian industry, including the aviation industry, would be legally fraught.
Tootle pip!!
PS: Suggested reading --- the four elements that must be satisfied for a "duty of care" to exist, and the legal effect of statute law modifying whether a duty of care exists in a particular circumstances ----- and in particular, whether a controller has a duty of care to provide positive separation to all "known traffic" --- as claimed by Civilair ---- contrary to the provisions of the airspace regulations, which may not require all known traffic to be separated in a particular classification of airspace.