Just been thinking more about this scenario and what would you do in a similar situation.
the TAF was
TAF AMD TAF AMD YSNF 180803Z 1808/1824 26008KT 9999 BKN010 FM181500 16012KT 9999 -SHRA BKN010 RMK
(the one before it was quite friendly however)
By my rough estimates at the point they received wx advice (904pm local) they were approximately 312nm or a bit more from Norfolk and around 360nm or so from Noumea. They are now faced with BKN at 1000 and well below the Alternate Minima, without carrying an alternate, yet still with 1hr 20 or more from the flame out (and several climbs so maybe a lot more cruise time), so they were at that point well within in striking range of Noumea plus reserves.
Why would they press on and not divert?
Why try to hide the fuel emergency from ATC and the UNICOM? They may have been able to add some clarity. If they had at the point the weather was passed to them would they have headed the advice to divert then or kept going? Did they realise they had a fuel emergency prior to TOD?
Why were they not thinking clearly about this? Fatigue perhaps? Or just far too brave!
More questions...........
