Many thanks to 20milesout for posting this. I've been waiting for the final on LH44.
Starbear: I too am amazed at the different take aways from the report.
Section 2.1.1 of the BFU Final Report
"The exemplary account of the aircraft manufacturer that, if the co-pilot's sidestick input had been delayed by 1.5 seconds the result would have been a maximum of 10 deg left wing down -- and would thus have avoided wingtip contact with the ground -- is theoretically understandable. However from a practical point of view of a pilot, this assessment can be queried [questioned]. With the aircraft under manual control, a time period of 1.5 seconds would have been difficult to coordinate precisely. Further it should be noted that in this specific case a reduction of the wind-down angle to a maximum of 10 deg would have prevented wingtip contact with the ground but also that pilots are enjoined to avoid unintended changes in the attitude just prior to touchdown."
From the OM/B and 1.18.2.2 of the BFU Final Report
"In strong crosswind conditions, small amounts of lateral control may be used to maintain the wings level. This lateral stick input must be reduced to zero at first main landing gear touchdown. Even during an approach of considerable turbulence, the control system resists the disturbances quite well without pilot inputs. In fact, the pilot should try to limit his control inputs to those necessary to correct he flight trajectory path and leave the task of countering air disturbances to the flight control system."
From 2.2.1 of the BFU Final Report
"Up until 20 ft above ground the approach was stabil[e] and exhibited aeronautically no reason for a go-around procedure."
From 2.2.3.1 of the BFU Final Report
"The BFU is of the opinion that, the captain as pilot-in-command did not reach his decision [about landing] using thus reasoning, because he did not regard the value maximum crosswind demonstrated for landing as an operational limit for the aircraft."
...
"Given this unusual weather situation, there was no company operational management support for the crew in their decision taking [making] process prior to or during the flight"
"Recommendation 01/2010 of the BFU Report
The aircraft manufacturer should initiate an assessment for the Aircraft Type A320 and Series with the aim that the transition logic Flight Mode/Ground Mode of the lateral control system switches into Ground Mode only if the aircraft is indeed on the ground." ...
My takeaways:
1. Given the wind conditions it isn't clear that anyone should have been taking off or landing that day. A 50% GA rate over the last 10 minutes is very high. If you are going to try to land in a 30 kt crosswind with gusts of 45-55 kt, you are hoping you don't get a black swan. LH management and Hamburg airport management let planes take off and land in conditions which were highly questionable.
There is kind a peer pressure situation where it is hard for a captain to say we are not going to fly when everyone else is. This is why the company needs to step in. The basic approach (no pun intended) seems to be lets fly to the destination, try for landing, and see how it goes.
2. This was complex worst case scenario, that happens only when there are hurricanes or other severe weather depressions present in the area. Wind gusts this high happen only 7 times/yr at this airport on average. In addition the specific wind gusts for this landing were worst case.
3. Airbus had to work very hard to find a way that the landing could be accomplished. Even though they found it, it is completely unclear to me that most pilots could fly it without practicing it first. Airbus doesn't want to have to make another update to 20 years old FCS for the A320 series.
4. If the FCS hadn't transitioned into Ground Law on a 1 wheel touchdown, the max right sidestick inputs that both pilots gave probably would have prevented a wingtip touchdown. In my opinion a fix is called for.
5. Documentation issues with the FM with respect to limits for cross wind landing limits and use of sidestick when landing.
On a personal note. In my opinion I believe the young FO did a great job, given her training and experience level. I believe she was criticized in the German press and the Captain was praised as a hero, which I think was very unfortunate. The Captain made the final decision to land, picked the runway, and declined runway 33, not the FO. I look forward to shaking her hand some day.
Questions:
A. How come the approximately 10 kt gust between just before wing touch which is clearly visible in diag 16 page 41/46 (the vector just before the red box for "wing touch") wasn't mentioned in the report? Didn't this contribute to the roll and wing touch?
B. I would love to know if this approach will be added to the simulator training for all LH/A320 pilots?
C. I would have liked to seen a CVR transcript?
FYI I am not a pilot but I am an engineer.