There’s no argument concerning the systemic failure. It was a monumental balls-up from start to finish. The only reason why the debate still rages is because of NZALPA’s stupid attempts to enshrine Mahon’s report and to deify the captain. I’m absolutely sure that if there is life after death, the captain will be eternally embarrassed.
I agree that from the position the left turn was commenced, it was too late. The aircraft was in the jaws of Lewis Bay, at 1500 feet, so it was doomed. But if the left turn had commenced only a few seconds beforehand, they might have made it out to the left. Not so the right, because of the high ground of Cape Bird, which extended back to about the “five o’clock” position relative to the aircraft. In other words, F/O Cassin was wrong.
You need to appreciate that this accident occurred in a different era. AirNZ’s employment policy up to the mid 1970s was to only employ air force pilots, whether they be RNZAF, RAAF, or RAF. That policy only started to relax when the supply started to dry up. Each and every captain who gave evidence to the Mahon Royal Commission had been a serving officer in an air force, usually the RNZAF. As such, they were all trained navigators and they all knew about the problems associated with briefings. The basic rule, which persists to this day, is that the pilot-in-command is responsible for the route. You can’t put the blame on contradictory information, because the pilot’s job is to sort that out and establish where he/she is going to. That is a fundamental aspect of piloting, and driving, and walking.
I guarantee that almost every 1970s captain will recall receiving contradictory information about a route. What was the response? Pick one and hope it’s right?