"But every pilot that flew that route prior did just that, and they were allowed to as long as the visibility was good - which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was."
From John King's publication New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation, which has the luxury of hindsight.
From 1987 until the disaster all those pilots had cheerfully flown down McMurdo Sound more or less on the approach path used by the Military Pilots, instead of over Ross Island. The former may have seemed the more logical route, keeping clear of high ground, but the airline preferred its DC10's to stay well away from any conflicting local traffic. In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures.
The one exception was Captain Roger Dalziell's flight which, because of unfavourable McMurdo weather took the alternative sightseeing route over the South Magnetic pole, diverting even before reaching the specified decision point of Cape Hallet. Its unpopularity with the passengers, however, was a likely factor in making Captain Collins more determined to press on to McMurdo when condition were marginal and, according to company instructions, well below minima for the area."
So, we see that not all flights prior did not "do that", and we are also told that the accident crew were well aware that the weather conditions were below that allowed by the company for descent in that area.
- "which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was."
That statement is quite obviously incorrect.
Last edited by prospector; 28th Feb 2010 at 03:28.