This appears to be one of those problems where pilots may be tempted to ‘out think’ the safe guards within aircraft certification. In these cases, first, start by following the manufacturers’ procedures and advice, and second, don’t dream up new personal procedures to address ‘hypothetical’ (at least very low probability) circumstances.
Aircraft certification requirements (CS 25 / FAR 25) require a very high level of reliability / redundancy for flight controls. A jammed elevator has to be considered, and an alterative means of control provided; the subsequent action should not require excessive strength or more than average skill.
Most aspects of system certification are based on probability – exposure to, and the severity of the event (CS 25.1309).
An aircraft must be able to survive an elevator jam at rotate; the alternative of stopping is usually deemed a very high risk.
A stop option above V1 should never be associated with an RTO; there are significantly different circumstances (situation assessment and decision making) and risks.
Pilots should not believe that they can evaluate rare and possibly unforeseen circumstances at the time of the event, particularly where high risk (or perceived risk) can bias judgement – apart from the stress of surprise. The solution is to be knowledgeable of procedures and advice, and skilled in the selection and execution of the most appropriate action for the situation; again knowledge - know what, when, how.
What is the purpose of demonstrating this failure in the simulator?
Primarily it should be to aid identification of the situation and then select and follow the procedures. The failure provides opportunity to improved flying skills with degraded control and then situation assessment and decision making – divert, heavy wt landing, limiting configuration.
Simulation should not be used to catch people out or present situations or advice which results in an accident. Simulators can and should be used to improve skill and confidence, familiarity with failures, and situation assessment. There should be less focus on specific ‘what ifs’ and more emphasis on generic procedures such as controlling surprise, not jumping to false conclusions, and acting rationally – not reinventing the wheel. Centaurus
So, not being qualified in the 737, what are the procedures for that aircraft?
Most, if not all the aircraft which I flew did not require the pilot to use trim to get airborne and establish initial control; thereafter trim (and flap) was a powerful control which had to be used carefully.