Have heard a few underpowered stories from out that way including hovering for lengthy periods as the jet-a burns off before being able to take off and the runway not being long enough in some conditions
They are 76C at Esso.
Re runway. There was a great deal of misunderstanding in the operation as to the requirements of Category A (full accountability for an engine failure), and Category B where there is no accountability. The charts published by the company for Cat A operations were remiss in not taking into account the distance required for a failure after the critical point, accelerating, and climbing to the screen height. There is no requirement to operate to Cat A, but despite trying to get the company to acknowledge that their Cat A was not necessarily Cat A, nothing had changed up to the time I left in 04. You can imagine the result of a failure after the critical point and a chap thinking he is Cat A capable, and finding he is not. BBQ anyone?
Platform take off. The book procedure was to have 3% N1 margin between hover and max available. Climb vertically to 25 feet on the RADALT with at least 200 ft/min and rotate. Not always complied with as the ethos was get the bloody job done. Platforms did not have temp gauges (despite the company standards manual) so you would never knew if you were going to be over your max landing weight, and a couple of interesting events took place as a result. Planning of the take off weight could be problematical at times, and I recall having to drop 600 lbs below the book figure once. Never resorted to it personally, but did hear of the burning off of fuel to get off with the load required.
You may think there is no commercial pressure, and in a sense you are correct. But, management made it plain that pilots were to do what they were told, and remember their salary is subject to a yearly appraisal. Going to kick the traces? Unions have their place. Pretty much lip service was paid to standards. CASA went so far to add a supplement to the flight manual spelling out the alternate requirements, on top of those contained in the ops manual and AIP's. Why did we not provide for alternates? The chances of anything going wrong and requiring use of an alternate are so infinitesimal that it need not be worried about was the company reply. With logic like that you have an uphill battle on your hands.
Oh and did I mention the budget. A manager lived or died by his budget. Spend a penny? Not if you could get away with less, for that's how his appraisal was judged.