Loss of Control In-Flight: Pilot Training Issues
I am currently serving as a pilot representative to an International Working Group charged with providing guidance to industry on how to reduce the rate of Loss of Control In-Flight accidents (LOC). Specifically, we are looking to identify the necessary components in pilot training activities that will provide a professional pilot the knowledge and skills to; (in order) avoid upset events, recognize upset events and recover from upset events.
I have been a user of PPRUNE for about two years, and have read many threads which touch on the issues concerning LOC to date. And while the committee I am working on will take a formal academic approach to reviewing the existing literature and research on the topic, I have always found it useful to solicit the "subjective" input of subject matter experts, of which there are many that contribute regularly and positively on this forum. I ask now for you help and input.
Our approach is to first produce a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) which will define what the specific knowledge and skill sets are necessary for a pilot to first AVOID, and then be able to recognize and (if required) recover from an upset. Upsets can be defined as exceeding 25 degrees nose-up, 10 degrees nose down, or exceeding 45 degrees of bank. In addition, an upset can also be defined as an in-appropriate airspeed or aircraft configuration which may require an alternate control strategy from a pilot (aileron hard-over, etc.). Also, of primary importance is a stall condition which is independent of airspeed.
The second chronological approach is to asses the existing knowledge and skill set of the "typical" professional airline pilot vis-a-vis upset recovery training (URT). This is a great challenge as this demographic varies greatly. This part of the effort is a "Gap Analysis" which will identify the deficit between the existing condition and that required to effectively meet the threat of LOC.
The third step is then to identify the variety of training tools available to close the deficit in ensuring pilots retain and maintain the necessary knowledge and skills to confront URT/LOC. These "training tools" include all available platforms (simulators, actual aircraft, etc.), media (academics, part-task trainers, etc.) and methodologies (enhanced URT instructors, MPL, AQP, LOFT-LOE, recurrent training, etc.) that can "prove" their efficacy.
Here is what we have "learned" to date.
1. Lack of wide-spread academic knowledge amongst professional pilots on the aerodynamics of upsets including specifically; high altitude aerodynamics, high-performance, swept wing aerodynamics, the approach to stall, and full-stall regime, use of and aerodynamics of primary and secondary flight controls.
2. Airlines "assume" pilots have this knowledge when "hired" and assume they "retain" this knowledge even though there is little emphasis on it in most airline recurrent training programs.
3. Research indicates that the majority of airline pilots do not posses the skill set necessary to recovery an actual aircraft from an actual upset. Two research organizations have been collecting practical research data for over 10 years to date in URT. This research includes over 1,000 airline pilots to date. Each pilot participated in a three day URT program, and we're given the syllabus, and briefed prior to beginning the course. Although the participants did not know which type of an upset they would encounter, they all knew they would be exposed to URT. The first battery of upsets were evaluated to measure the performance of the participating airline pilots.
Conclusion; over 75% of airline pilots could not recover the aircraft on the first attempt. Now the good news; after the three days of training, over 90% of these same pilots could recover the aircraft from a littany of upset scenarios.
4. There exists a marked decrease in the number of existing airline pilots who have actually been exposed to realistic upset recovery training (in an actual aircraft). The number of former military pilots who have extensive training in this arena is decreasing. Very few civilian trained pilots have exposure to aerobatics or an actual aircraft upset environment. This trend is increasing.
5. Industry has produced an excellent training aid in the "Upset Recovery Training Aid, version 2". However, unfortunately, it has not been widely adapted as a training resource by industry.
6. Full Flight Simulators (FFS) can be a valuable training tool for some URT scenarios. However, many times they are used in-appropriately. The aerodynamic data for a FFS is normally only the "normal flight envelope" of the type aircraft. Therefore, any "extreme" maneuvers out of the normal envelope may be protrayed in-accurately. In addition, and obviously, the capability of replicating the actual "G" environment and acceleration forces is extremely limited. To say nothing of the pshycological aspects of a "real" upset as opposed to a "simulated" upset.
7. Often the instructors utilized by industry in the FFS have no specific or advanced training in the URT regime. This can lead to in-accurate training or a failure to ensure particpants are receiving the appropriate training.
8. We cannot assume that proficient URT performance in a FFS indicates that a professional pilot can perform to that standard in an actual aircraft upset. Indeed, the practical research mentioned above indicates that the very high-stress environment of an actual aircraft upset requires a pilot to actually experience that environment before they can derive the discipline and "experience" necessary to deal with URT.
9. Regulators have contributed to "poor" performance in this regime with negative training. For the FAA, the practical test standards for approach to stall recovery that emphasize "minimum loss of altitude" over regaining aircraft control by reducing AOA and un-loading the aircraft have had negative consequences. In addition, there still exists no mandated URT training (with the exception of the new MPL). We no longer require "spin" training. It is entirely likely that a pilot completing a professional training curricula will never be exposed to an "in-verted" state, or perform an actual approach to stall in a real aircraft.
On top of these issues, there are general trends in industry which may be exacerbating the threat of LOC and the risk of lower URT pilot performance;
1. The over-reliance on Automation (a basic conclusion of Human Factors experts is that humans are "poor" monitors. Indeed, the better the reliability of a system, the less effective the human is at monitoring the performance of the system). 2. A decline in manual flying skills (handling issues). 3. A decline in academic knowledge of aerodynamics. 4. Complexity of automation and flight displays which, when hardware failures occur, mask or increase the complexity for pilots to analyze and recover the aircraft.
Please provide your input on any area mentioned above, or concerns you have regarding how we can best prepare professional pilots to meet the challenge of succesfully preventing LOC.
ps.....I apologize for the spelling and grammatical errors....can't find spell check here....