Further the failure to inspect the runway prior to every concorde takeoff is absurdly irresponsible given the potentially catostrophic outcome that was statistically unavoidable over a large enough sample set.
When you need to inspect the runway before each takeoff due to potentially catastrophic outcomes it's probably that something is wrong with the aircraft itself. Maybe M2dude can confirm if BA had such mandatory inspections in its SOPs?
The aircraft was highly over weight, taking off with a tailwind.
The aircraft's takeoff weight has been estimated between 185.598 kg and 186.251 kg. The MTOW was 185.070. At that point it is not exactly "highly" overweight and mainly depend on the reference used to calculate passengers weights. By using the 76 kg per pax you get 185.598 kg, 528kg above MTOW.
The restriction on weight comes from the tailwind which involves an increased ground roll speed. Tires have a maximum roll speed based on aircraft's weight. In case of tailwind the takeoff weight has to be reduced to a lower limit in order not to exceed the tires max speed. With an 8 kts tailwind the MTOW becomes 180.300 due to this tire speed limit. At this stage I want to make 2 comments:
1- The wind given by the tower was measured on the parallel runway (26L). The average wind (over 2 minutes) on this threshold was 090/03 while at the opposite runway end (08) the wind was 320/03. Despite the crew's decision to takeoff with the reported wind, it's very improbable that the aircraft actually encountered 8 kts of tailwind at the end of its takeoff roll.
2- Since the tire got burst well before reaching its rolling speed limitation, it is quite clear that exceeding an eventual tailwind MTOW limitation didn't play any role in the accident. By the time the tire was destructed, the aircraft wasn't exceeding its rolling speed limitation.
The CG was way beyond the ABSOLUTE maximum for T/O of 54%
The CG was announced at 54% following fuel transfer before takeoff.