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Old 1st Feb 2010, 20:42
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338C
 
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: Sydney
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FMA "Call Outs"

Jeff reports that the Captain failed to notice he engaged the A/P rather than the A/T.

In a publication of B757 systems the author quotes the phrase "you live and die by the ADI". He refers to using the ADI to ascertain what autoflight modes are actually engaged.
Some operators require verbal annunciations of all FMA changes.
The procedure compels the crew to focus on the annunciations.
In this instance would a similar SOP have alerted the crew of an incorrect mode selection?

Jeff's information eludes to the Captain being the PF and the person engaging the A/T while also steering the aircraft. In this instance would the cockpit workload be better distributed if the PNF set the manual thrust and performed any other required functions at the direction of the PF Captain?
Such a procedure has the secondary benefit of bringing the PNF F/O more effectively into the loop.

Manual setting of T/O thrust does not appear to be a procedure that is trained for or practiced in the simulator. As a result when it is required on the line the procedure is a "novel" event. Performance on the first sector is often well below par. Crews fail to achieve the required thrust by the required speed and loose their monitoring capacity as a result of the task fixation.
The crew coordination required for this procedure is significant.
Would crews benefit if simulator sequences had more emphasis on events that utilise manual modes?
It is possible that CRM and management skills may improve while responding to the more demanding situation.
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