My bullsh*t filters have got seriously clogged up reading most of the posts on this thread!
The important facts are that the 737 took the wrong turn, but stopped before he crossed the red lights and entered the active runway. An initial error was made, but the aircraft was brought to a stop to clarify the clearance before the next potential (catastrophic) error was made.
Meanwhile the Tower controller spotted the error, told the 737 to hold position and without waiting for a response canceled the take-off clearance for the CX 777. This RTO was expeditiously carried out at low speed. This sort of thing happens from time to time. Twice so far to me, once due to HKATC and once due to KA over the past 15 years.
Basically a mistake was made, but all the subsequent holes in the swiss-cheese failed to line up because everyone was on the ball, and did their job.
The obvious issue worth review is for the 737 operator regarding how they read-back, cross-check and re-state their taxi clearances. Probably the place everyone is most complacent with taxiing is their home base, which is why puritan SOP's are important.
On the very first sector of my command course, a very senior-well respected BTC (yes
) was the PF ex-HKG. We taxied from the north side down "W" onto "J" for 25L. However, he tried to turn right on "J" as if departing on 07R!!!! As a trainee on a hair-trigger, I was on top of this and we were still able to complete a shoddy turn in the right direction. I initially thought that, "oh-blast, this command course, is going to be a real pain!". However, it was a genuine error. The BTC had departed off 07R for the past 4 days in a row, and had relaxed his guard. I thank him for a great lesson!
In a training situation this is doubly likely to happen, because you are often thinking about how to debrief things which occurred during the pre-departure phase, or maybe thinking about how to discuss the next issue. Being very current is closely associated with a risk of becoming complacent. Trainers beware!
Sooner or later, we will all make a significant professional mistake. This is guaranteed. If we were bankers etc, then our bonus would be at stake. If we were Medical doctors then a patients life would be at stake! However, as Airline pilots we are usually assumed to be the culprits in the smokey front row seats at the scene of the accident, when
anyone involved in our operation makes a mistake. Vigilance and robust SOP's may be a pain to adopt, but they are essential for this HKG 737 operator to develop into a professional operation.
I laughed when I read the Malaysian comments regarding CX difficulties with understanding Malaysian ATC English. Has this correspondent flown outside of Asia recently? Been to JFK, LAX, SFO, LHR, CDG, FRA or SYD recently? Listened to every other legacy Carrier from across the world struggle with south-east Asian colloquialism.
It is nice to hear that CX flights need a couple of read-backs to ensure that their clearance is correct, that is what we are supposed to do when faced with non ICAO phraseology etc. Would Malaysian ATC please always state QNH when clearing aircraft for descent to altitudes (as the rest of the world do). Please also state "descend
altitude five thousand" rather than "descend five thousand", which is again non-ICAO.
NOTAMS in this region are internationally a joke. Some years ago I was due to depart, and after protracted delays (by this time, on the taxi-way with engines running) it became evident that the airport was closed for 30+? minutes because an Airbus380 was doing a fly-past. Nothing was NOTAMed.
Some years ago I operated a KUL-PEN sector. The weather was horrible. During the transit in KUL, we listened to the TWR frequency and heard a SEA local carrier cleared for take off. He responded, that he would need an immediate turn after take-off, stating a heading (approximately 90 degrees off runway heading) due to "CB". Tower responded, "cleared for take-off, make your request with departure freq xxxx". The local carrier then proceeded to take off, contacted departure, and merely
requested the heading. After being granted the heading he reported "wind-shear loss of 30 knots".