B777 Atr
The B777 Auto throttle, ATR is not like the B737, B744 or B757/767 system.
It is a true full time system, and there is only NNCL procedures to disarm the ATR, unless a Flight operations department has decided to apply their corporate wisdom to change the manufacturer's procedure. This can occur from either a operator perceived deficiency in the manufacturers procedures, to standardise with other types in the operators fleet, etc... Where the procedure deviation may vary from the AFM, then a No Technical Objection is required from the manufacturer.
There is no normal condition where the ATR is better served by being turned off, including single engine operations (although if you have no TAC, no PFC's and degraded hydraulics and single engine, it is easier to fly manually without the ATR.... ). On a manual landing at 25'RA the ATR retards the thrust to idle, unless the aircraft mode is FLCH or TOGA.... The pilot is not restricted in overriding the ATR manually at any time, and once the override pressure is released, the throttles revert to the commanded thrust level. it is infrequent that this occurs, even in modest windshears, IMHO (~8,000 PIC on type).
ref: FCOM 4.20.8, FCTM,
This is in stark contrast to the B737/747/744/757/767 system design and performance.
AF did have a mishap related to manual flight with an inadvertent ATR re engagement on a B744 landing at Tahiti, which ended in tears and photo opportunities, which would certainly tend to make people cautious about the ATR arming switches of a B744, but the B777 is not in so many ways (good and bad...) a B744.
This event should be a wake up call for AF, it is an opportunity to learn from an accident without having suffered same, as this very nearly was a catastrophic event. maturity of their flight operations department will be evident in their response, either shooting the messenger, or working out why their system of training, procedures, and practices failed miserably on the day, and by the benevolent smile of lady luck avoided a major mishap, from a minor procedural oversight.
The decision to continue a takeoff in manual thrust when the ATR does not engage in TOGA mode is one that I have misgivings on, as it indicates a technical or operational defect exists in a time critical phase of flight. The FCTM procedure does not call or suggest fault finding, just manually applying the requisite thrust level. fault finding and mode changing on the fly is a potentially hazardous proposition, as either an error of analysis, switching or other can occur and little or no crosschecking will be conducted. This is anathema to 2 pilot operation SOP's. The subsequent defect identified by the pilot of a flight control restriction at the point of initiating the rotate, is apparently not cognitively linked to the non standard procedure of engaging the ATR (accidentally engaging the AP). The mode changes are not identified by the crew apparently on the roll during this event at all, indicating some limitations of monitoring of crews in a high workload environment. This is not a criticism of the crew per se, it is an observation of the limitations of the human to cognitively multi channel in a dynamic environment. The oversight of the ATR switch in the preflight check, where it is listed in the POM, Ch5.3 needs also to be assessed in the light of duty time/fatigue/etc before lining up the messenger against a suitably pockmarked wall.
This event should serve as a warning to any organisation that is complacent in their operational safety record, procedures and CRM principles, to the point of hubris.