Although I’m paid to view these things through dark blue glasses, I do become irritated by the recurrent hamster wheel arguments about Typhoons.
They have been ordered and the funds are committed (not that Commitment seems to matter much in the new and clever RAB world). If, in the event, we can’t or won’t pay for them, the contract and the Contractor will ensure that we do effectively pay for them. To sell on used or new machines, the price would need to be a fraction of that originally paid and would not make long term financial sense. You will note that I used 2 (well, 2 sets of 2, actually) words there that are alien to British Government; “long term” and “financial sense”.
The Typhoon is being built and is available at a stable price now. The Lines won’t stay open much longer than the final production batch needs. Keeping empty Lines open/available is possible but would make the product price so high that it would make no financial sense. The Lines also need other component Lines in 4 different Countries.
The Typhoon can be expected to be in service for around 50 years. In that time, aircraft will be lost or otherwise written off. Can we guess how many? If deterrence fails and we use them in action (or even just using them for CAS on current Ops), there will probably be losses and reserves will be needed to maintain momentum. With that in mind, why are we so dismissive and critical of the numbers ordered?
What’s that old Yorkshire saying? buy cheap and buy twice?
With regard to Thomas Harding; has Lewis Page taken to using a pen name?