Link to report of the 3 Fellows
Permalink 5976 refers - Page 299 @ 13:16
On 9 Jan 10, the Guardian published this agreed abridged version of our letter which may be found with others on
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/09/chinook-crash-1993-evidence-software
It reads:
In his reply to recent coverage of the “positively dangerous” software implementation in Chinook fuel computers (Letters, 6 January), Air Chief Marshal Stephen Dalton makes three main claims and admissions.
1. The “positively dangerous” status of the software was well known at the time. That being so, perhaps the MoD would say what corrective action was taken, and why it wasn’t corrected before the assistant chief of air staff signed the release to service (RTS) in November 1993?
2. That the above status was “factored into the operating instructions”. These instructions are, primarily, the aircrew manual and the flight reference cards. Successive inquiries, including the MoD’s own board of inquiry, heard irrefutable evidence of the immaturity of these documents. Indeed, the evidence of one Chinook flight commander at the time described them as “incomprehensible to aircrew operating the aircraft”. Again, why did assistant chief of the air staff sign the RTS, given such a fundamental breach of the airworthiness regulations?
3. That the software issue was discounted after the Air Accident Investigation Branch report. This is quite wrong. A search of the report shows no mention of “positively dangerous”, or even the word “software”. However, it does state that the (fuel computer) “operating program” was “not altered from delivery”. That is, it remained in the “positively dangerous” state advised by the MoD’s own experts at Boscombe Down.
ACM Dalton’s letter, far from protecting the MoD’s position, actually admits they knew ofthe problems and adds weight to our submission that the aircraft was demonstrably not airworthy. It is now time for the MoD to say why this decision was made. Who, we ask, would sign to say an aircraft was safe in the face of world-leading, expert advice that the fuel computer software implementation was “positively dangerous”? And why would they do this before taking corrective action?
Finally, as ACM Graydon was the superior of the assistant chief of the air staff, was he aware of his signing the RTS/air force department release (RTS/AFDR) and why he (and controller of aircraft) disregarded the advice of Boscombe Down?
Captain Ralph Kohn, Captain Ron Macdonald and Captain Richard KJ Hadlow
Compiler and co-authors of the Macdonald Report (April 2000)
To refresh memories, I understand that the on-line Guardian copy of the published letter now has a link to our original Macdonald Report of the Year 2000, as now updated by a new Jan 2010 Addendum 4, captioned "HC2 - RAF Acceptance Airworthiness Connotations".
The Macdonald Report may be found on
http://www.scribd.com/share/upload/20816348/2ecf7hocouvm9wc81n
In the context of military accident investigations, may I draw attention to the "Report of Study of Accident Investigation Procedures in the Armed Services" by W H Tench CBE CEng FRAeS, published in January 1987 with recommendations that make interesting reading?
Mr Tench was the former Head of the UK Air Accidents Investigation Board.
On 19 May 1986, he was appointed by the then Minister of Defence Support, to conduct a study with the following terms of reference:
“To examine the reports and investigate the methods of conducting inquiries into military aircraft accidents in all three Services and MoD(PE) in order to establish whether alternative procedures, or any other features, would be more efficient or effective in determining the cause of accidents.”
Here is hoping that someone may find something of interest in our report, but in particular Addendum 4 which was written at the end of last year as a letter to MoD and copied to others in Westminster. The Tench report may be found ‘on line’ (55 pages).
For the "3 Fellows" who prepared the Macdonald report.