Speculation and Guilt
For once I can agree with something that JP has said - why indeed having made the waypoint change and taken the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse (WP1) off the system did they not turn - even MOD has confirmed in writing that a waypoint change would normally be coincident with a course change. So, did they deliberately continue to fly towards the Mull (which they certainly knew was there), did something distract them (comment from Stn Cdr Odiham in his remarks about accepted Release to Service problems such as false engine fail warnings) or did they lose control of one of the engines or even suffer a control restriction (both problems with this very aircraft over the previous few days). JP doesn't know, I certainly don't know, I am pretty sure Robert would have said that he doesn't know and even, wait for it, the two senior reviewing officers don't know!
I remind you of what ACM Wratten said:
1. Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact. What does emerge from the Inquiry however, is that there is no evidence whatever of any combination of possible minor problems, or of any major difficulty, which would have so taxed the skills of the crew that they had no option other than to keep flying towards high ground at speed at low level in deteriorating conditions of cloud and visibility. From this I am reluctantly drawn to the conclusion that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue. What they should have done and what they were trained to do is succinctly described by the AOC. Why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know. What we do know however, and what the two pilots would also have known, is that of all the hazards inherent, in aviation, hitting the ground without intending or expecting to carries the lowest likelihood of survival and consequently the risk of this occurring must be avoided at ail costs. This was the pre-eminent responsibility of the two pilots and there is not even a hint of any circumstances which would have been beyond their professional skills to accommodate, or which would have justified them taking the risk of proceeding as they did. Lamentably, all the evidence points towards them having ignored one of the most basic tenets of airmanship, which is never to attempt to fly visually below safety altitude unless the weather conditions are unambiguously suitable for operating under Visual Flight Rules.
2. I therefore agree with the AOC's summary, in particular that the actions of the two pilots were the direct cause of this crash. I also conclude that this amounted to gross negligence.
Everything after the sentence I have outlined in bold is based on speculative opinions not facts - something that the HofL Select Committee (with I suggest somewhat more eminent legal quailifications than CAS) did not accept when the senior reviewing officers were able to make their case to them at length. Speculation is not compatible with Gross Negligence and, as CAS has conveniently ignored, was not allowed by the RAF's own rules of the time. As Malcolm Rifkind (another eminent legal brain) pointed out this non fact supported verdict (effectively a finding of manslaughter) based on an incomplete investigation by the BOI and opinions and speculative decisions by senior officers in the Command Chain, and with no possibility for the dead pilots (or their families) to defend themselves would not stand up in any Court in the land.
Someone asked if the families would now accept a verdict of pilot error - presumably a "balance of probabilities - pilot error" rather than NPD. I can't speak for the families, but I wouldn't now that we know just how much of the "available" (good word that - saves the word "new" coming into the equation) evidence was either not seen or not considered by the BoI. Incidentally this same evidence was not, if the MOD's own request of October 1995 for legal opinion is correct, made available to the MOD's legal team for the FAI either - funny that - like the question on why they did not change course I could only speculate - but I won't!
JB