ShyT
Perhaps I am a bit one-eyed on this – I actually could interpret the following as the same as what I was saying:
<<...in the case of a serious emergency, RAF training recommends that 7700 is selected, if no other code was given after making contact with an ATC agency. >>
This could be a litmus test for whether we are able to communicate at all rationally – does what you wrote contradict what I have been saying about not changing SSR code immediately a serious problem accurs? Are you not saying that, whilst still having your transponder set as before, you first try to alert some ATC authority?
Subsequent to trying to raise an alert, if no other code was given or indeed if there had not been a timely response, then 7700 would be the usual option.
BUT it is not the practice to scabble at the switches immediately (ask ATC people),
Perhaps while we're on the subject of the transponder setting you could give some helpful advice as you have flown these beasts quite a lot:
the relevance is the expected radar coverage of them during their sea crossing;
if you had been flying the leg over the sea from Carnlough to the vicinity of the Mull low level, VFR would you have cruised above 750ft or below 250ft? Or was someone pulling my leg over generally avoiding 500ft to leave it for the FJs?
Cows
<<Why is there not one who is willing to even acknowledge that your theory may have some substance?>>
Good question! I realise it is difficult for servicemen to express contravertial views openly, quite apart from the “groupthink” mentality – I'll bet there wasn't many expressing support for the views of Dr David Kelly before you set off for Iraq, either. This is not meant as an insult – you have to think and move as a confident team – it is a statement of understanding why, indeed, no one wants to contemplate the overall scenario I have put forward.
That said, I am at a loss to understand why some of the more innocuous aspects of navigation equipment, procedures, performance, etc cannot be honestly and fully addressed – you don't have to swallow the big plot to take part in a discussion which could at least advance understanding of this crash – following this line so far has, I believe I can claim, at least shown the “official” account of their flight to be hogwash and that the verdict is baseless – the airworthiness issue could never hope to exonerate the crew more cleanly than it being established that a hitherto undisclosed activity was part of the flight plan. Worth a little thought, surely?