The Times today (Times of London for colonial readers) headlines its second leader 'Unfit for Purpose (Continued) and summarises the sorry history detailed in the thread above.
Being self-serving can also prove self-defeating. The Ministry of Defence, by refusing to reconsider its verdict that the 1994 helicopter crash which killed 29 people was caused by “gross negligence” by the pilots, is risking its credibility just to save face. More is at stake than the reputation of two dead servicemen — though that in itself should matter to the MoD more than anyone. There is also a deeper question: is the MoD putting pride before honour?
2009 was a year that the Ministry of Defence must be keen to forget. Bernard Gray, a former special adviser for defence, wrote a devastating official report complaining about a culture of waste and incompetence. A separate official report by Charles Haddon-Cave, a leading aviation lawyer, concluded that the 2006 plane crash in Afghanistan that killed 14 Service personnel was avoidable and caused by financial pressure and cuts.
The new year has not begun well, either. The MoD is now facing renewed questions about the causes of the Chinook helicopter disaster of 1994. The helicopter crashed in thick fog in the Mull of Kintyre, killing all 29 people on board — the RAF’s worst peacetime helicopter accident. The tragedy also had a delicate political backdrop: 25 of those who died were senior members of Northern Ireland’s intelligence community. The RAF’s original inquiry blamed the two pilots, finding them guilty of gross negligence. That version of events is now looking unsustainable and unacceptable.
The guilt of the two pilots, who had unblemished careers until that fatal flight, was established by default. The RAF argued that human failure was the only available explanation. But the families of the pilots, and many aviation experts, have long argued that the ruling represented an unjust blight on two fine careers.
The MoD’s position relied on the assumption that technical failures in the Chinook’s software system could not explain such a disastrous degree of error. But that possibility can no longer be ruled out. Before the crash, several internal MoD documents raised significant alarms about the Chinook’s engine control computer software, describing it as positively dangerous. One memo, written nine months before the crash by a senior engineering officer, argued that “deficiencies” in the software meant that the pilot’s control of the engines could not be assured. Another, written the day before the crash, stated it was imperative that the RAF should cease operations.
None of this, it must be said, conclusively proves that the crash must have been caused by computer error. Human negligence remains a possibility. In fact, given the catastrophic nature of the crash, it is impossible that anyone will ever know for sure what caused the disaster. But growing evidence that the MoD was concerned about the Chinook’s safety software does clearly demonstrate an inescapable degree of uncertainty — more than enough uncertainty to justify reversing the guilty verdict imposed on the two pilots.
So why is the MoD so reluctant to change its position? In the phrase of Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was Defence Secretary in 1994, it seems to be a case of bureaucratic stubbornness. Continuing to blame the pilots, in fact, is starting to look like something more serious than just a mistake. It suggests a worrying culture of denial.