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Old 5th Jan 2010, 05:23
  #196 (permalink)  
SPA83
 
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: france
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unsafe condition

The inconsistency of measured speeds resulting from blockage of Pitot probe is "an event that can cause victims usually with the destruction of the plane! This event can lead pilots to excessive workload which does not allow them to perform their tasks accurately or completely! “

The FAA (USA) made that affirmation several times in a document* dated September 9, 2009 using just 2 words : "unsafe condition"!

The BEA has very kindly referred to the definition of an "unsafe condition" in his report of last December 17.

What the FAA said, the European Agency for Aviation Safety (EASA) has not wanted or dared to say ... but saying it anyway.

When, in August 2009, the elimination of the Pitot probe Thales AA, fitted to the A-330 flight AF 447, is considered mandatory, EASA issued an "airworthiness directive” (AD) but claiming that it was simply a precautionary measure.

An AD for a precautionary measure, it does not exist!

When the manufacturer and EASA detect a problem that is not an "unsafe condition" but that requires a response, EASA publishes a SAFETY INFORMATION BULLETIN (SIB).

Extract of EASA document** entitled "Continuing Airworthiness of Type Design (CAP)" (March 2008). Page 39:

Only when design related issues which may lead to unsafe condition are considered likely to exist or develop, issuance of an airworthiness directive is warranted.

And

Information may be available to EASA related to airworthiness concerns on aircraft under national registers, but for which insufficient evidence exists to qualify this as an 'unsafe condition'. In such a case, the PCM [1] may elect the publication of an SIB, containing information for the safe operation of the affected aircraft.

To remove the Pitot probe Thales AA, EASA issued an AD… not a SIB.

There was therefore an "unsafe condition" that required an answer (the elimination of the Pitot probe Thales AA) !

This response came very late because the pilots of flight AF 447 had not been advised of the existence of this potential "unsafe condition"!


They were asked to accommodate the lack of pitot probes Thales AA and ensure accountability of the "unsafe condition" by applying a checklist when it is defined that an "unsafe condition" may lead the pilots to excessive workload which does not allow them to perform their tasks accurately or completely!

* http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b.../102670700.pdf

** http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b...1239787795.pdf
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