We are now aware that the HC2 was demonstrably not airworthy - fact. Never mind the limited MTOW, the poor icing clearance and the lack of compliance with the mandated regs, the navigation equipment the crews needed to 'legally' fly IMC had no clearances for use, nor had the nav performance been confirmed by BD (itself indicative of an immature ac/V&V program). That, perhaps, explains why the crew insisted on a HC1, which did have all the clearances? Of course, there weren't any HC1s left!
As Tuc says, the paperwork trail definitively places the onus of airworthiness responsibility on some very senior people indeed. In none of the enquiries - BoI/FAI/PAC nor HoL- has this aspect been explored and neither have the people involved been questioned. That would be interesting but, as I see it now, they don't need to be; the new evidence leads directly to them.
If the MoD had this info, as they admit, then why didn't the Service and MoD legal types advise the AMs to bring it to the attention of all the above legal enquiries? Did they do so? If they did, why did the AMs decline to oblige?
I think we can work out the answer to that one! Perhaps even, the AMs were covering for their own bosses? This could get interesting.
flipster