MoD claims the aircraft was airworthy.
Where was that stated
at the time? The Release to Service (the Master Airworthiness Reference) and the Controller Aircraft Release (the statement by CA to the RAF that the aircraft is airworthy).
The CAR is based on advice from Boscombe (who stated it was NOT airworthy) and subsumed in its entirety in the RTS.
Therefore, there is no audit trail to any advice the aircraft was airworthy, beyond the CAR, which is little more than an early list of what little clearance work had been done by Boscombe but, more importantly, a clear statement of the huge amount of work yet to be commenced. (And pressure from the RAF/Army, suggested in the articles, does not constitute formal advice).
Thus, the focus should be on why these documents were signed in November 1993. As the Boscombe statement was made prior to signature (9 months before the crash), the key questions are;
- Was Controller Aircraft informed by his staffs (DHP and DGA2) of Boscombe’s formal position?
- Likewise, was the Assistant Chief of Air Staff informed by CA, or his own staffs?
I suggest, regardless of the answer, gross negligence and abrogation of Duty of Care has occurred within this small staffing group. It does not go lower, because the (RN) officer immediately below DHP is on record, 2 months before the crash, as pleading with his bosses (DHP and DGA2) to take heed of Boscombe’s position.
DHP was a civilian 1 Star. DGA2 an RAF 2 Star. CA a civilian 3 Star. ACAS an RAF 3 Star.