Mr. James Gray (North Wiltshire): Will the Minister give way?
Dr. Moonie : No. In 12 minutes, I cannot go through all our programmes and the balance of choices that we had to strike when deciding what and what not to keep.
There have been many references to danger and past conflicts. I remind Opposition Members that all operational decisions that we make involve a balance of risk for our forces. We are well aware that we may call on our men and women to make the ultimate sacrifice on our behalf. We need no reminders about that from Opposition Members.
Last week, Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, in charge of commitments, gave evidence to the Select Committee on Defence. I shall paraphrase his remarks, because the evidence has not yet been published as a minute and has merely been placed on the internet for information. His comments provide an appropriate framework for our discussion. He said that to sustain the Sea Harrier—the FA2—beyond 2006 as a viable weapon system would require a great deal of investment and entailed substantial technical risk. He went on to say that a number of other areas of the programme required investment and, as ever, it was a question of balance of priorities. Given the need to balance the priorities and the risk, the decision was taken that it would not be sensible for that period of time to make the degree of investment in the Sea Harrier that would have been necessary to keep it viable in service.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. John McWilliam): Order. May I assist the Minister? The fact that the Committee's sitting was public and the transcript has gone out on the internet means that he can quote every word of it.
Dr. Moonie : I am grateful for that, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I would hate to have overstepped the bounds of propriety in quoting from a Select Committee.
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Sir Jock went on to ask:
"what is that we seek in terms of capability from our carriers? We seek the projection of offensive power. That was the purpose behind the decision to procure two new larger carriers in the defence review. The carriers are about the projection of offensive power in which the Sea Harrier plays a very small part and a reducing part as the technology, in terms of offensive power, moves on."
When questioned further, he said:
"I need to make clear, before moving on some more detail about air defence, why we have carriers in the first place and it is not to provide air defence for the fleet, it is to provide projection of offensive power. Clearly, if you have a fleet at sea, you need to make sure that it is properly protected from the range of threats that it might face: sub-surface, surface and from the air as well. We are introducing, as you know, the Type-45 Destroyer".
He went on to describe the future systems.
Patrick Mercer : Sir Jock Stirrup also said that he could not see that destroyers would ever wholly fill the capability that aircraft currently provided.
Dr. Moonie : Absolutely. No one has tried to pretend otherwise for a moment. If the hon. Gentleman reads carefully at the remarks that were made last week, when Sir Jock was speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Defence, he will see that we are well aware that any decision like the one we are debating involves a balance of risk. Nobody has attempted to hide that— neither Ministers nor any of our senior military advisers who have led us to our decision
The Sea Harrier has had a long and distinguished career and the decision to withdraw the aircraft earlier than planned was complex. I welcome the opportunity to explain the decision that was announced on 28 February and how we plan to improve the utility of the joint force Harrier to meet today's and tomorrow's defence needs. The aircraft was procured in the mid 1970s to meet the threat posed principally by shadowing reconnaissance aircraft and long-range bombers threatening our anti-submarine forces operating in the North Atlantic in concert with United States Navy nuclear aircraft carrier battle groups.
The Sea Harrier entered service in 1979 and, as hon. Members have recalled, it achieved early operational success in the campaign to recover the Falkland Islands in 1982, accounting for 26 Argentine aircraft. Today, of course, the circumstances in Argentina and the nature of the Falklands garrison are entirely different. Beginning in 1994 the Sea Harrier fleet was upgraded to the FA2 standard to provide an enhanced capability for the following decade. When the Sea Harrier is withdrawn from service in 2006 it will have been in service for a significant length of time—more than 25 years, which is far longer than most of its predecessors in the Fleet Air Arm.
A strong theme throughout the strategic defence review was the importance of joint operations. The SDR concluded that the emphasis for the Invincible-class carriers had already moved away from cold war deep-water anti-submarine operations supported by the Sea Harrier providing a limited air defence capability. In future, as Sir Jock Stirrup said, the priority will be the delivery of flexible expeditionary air power, with an increased emphasis on ground-attack strike missions
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from the embarked air group. That has been confirmed in the emerging conclusions of our post-11 September work.
Mr. Prisk : Is the Minister arguing that we do not need any air defence aircraft? Certainly all hon. Members present would accept that there is a case for having an increased ground-attack capability. The concern here is that the removal of all air defence capabilities removes the defence and security of the personnel. This long read-out passage, which seems to be replacing a speech, does not answer that question.
Dr. Moonie : I have already made the point, but I shall make it again. We are not saying that there is no change in the balance of risk, but our advice and the advice that we have received from the service chiefs on which we base our decisions is that the balance of risk is acceptable. We are not saying that in an ideal world we would not have every capability, but we do not live in an ideal world. We live in the real world and within that we must make decisions. The balance of risk has changed, but it remains acceptable.
Mr. Jenkin : The hon. Gentleman is arguing that the aircraft is old. The FA2, which was introduced in 1993, is a much newer aircraft than the Tornado GR1A or GR4A, which was introduced in 1989, or the Tornado F3, which was introduced in 1986, or the Jaguar, which the Government are keeping in service and which was introduced in 1973. The age of the aircraft is not relevant to the debate.
Dr. Moonie : Unfortunately, the age of the aircraft is relevant to the debate. The upgrade in the FA2 is concerned predominantly with avionics and other systems that are placed on the aircraft. The aircraft frame remains old. The aircraft structure remains old, and there is nothing that we can do about that. The hon. Gentleman has not properly examined what the upgrades involve. I now want to make some progress. As usual, I have given way far too often. I apologise to the hon. Member for North Wiltshire for not giving way to him before, but I want to finish my remarks.
The strategic defence review included a commitment to establish a joint force Harrier—a joint, flexible and deployable force that is ideally suited to the demands of the new strategic environment. It was formed on 1 April 2000 under the command of 3 Group, Strike Command, and it operates two aircraft types. During 2001, it became evident that both Sea Harrier FA2 and the GR7 would require substantial investment over the next few years to ensure that they remained effective until replaced by the future joint combat aircraft. Upgrades to both aircraft types were considered, but the improvement and maintenance of one type was deemed achievable and preferable to maximise our ability to deliver carrier-based offensive air power in a joint force.
To ensure that the Harrier GR7 fleet maintains a credible expeditionary capability by day and night from land and sea until the introduction to service of the FJCA, several important aircraft system enhancements will be necessary, and they have been drawn together to form the GR9 upgrade programme. The GR9 aircraft will be able to communicate securely with each other and with likely coalition parties, and they will be capable
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of employing the latest smart and precision weapons. They will enable the Harriers to deliver the Brimstone anti-armour missile, the precision guided bomb, the Maverick missile and so on. There will be considerable upgrades.