The Under-Secretary of State for Defence will know that there is not only the question whether we need Sea Harriers to defend our fleet in the future, but the fact that in some conflicts we will need aircraft that can defend our ground-attack aircraft against attack from other aircraft. An officer who served with the Fleet Air Arm in the Falklands conflict put that point to me this morning. One consideration that we have perhaps underplayed so far is the great concern felt by experienced, serving and former members of the armed forces about the Government's decision. That includes the taskforce commander in the Falklands, who said that it would impossible to mount a similar campaign now without the protection that Sea Harriers currently provide and that we will shortly lose.
I do not want to open up a gap between my Conservative colleagues and myself, but we should also address the Government's intentions in respect of European Union military capability. Were the Government not intending combat aircraft, including Sea Harriers, to form an important part of that military capability? What decisions have the Government taken about the gap that will be opened up with their future inability to deliver on their commitment to our EU partners regarding the availability of Sea Harriers to act as air defence for our fleet and, potentially, the ships of other EU navies?
Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife): My hon. Friend raises a very important point that relates to not only the European security and defence policy, but to our NATO allies. The capability represented by the Sea Harriers is a NATO capability in the sense that it is available to NATO. Does my hon. Friend have any information about the extent to which the Government's decision was the subject of consultation with our NATO allies, particularly the United States, to whom we might have to look for the protection that the Sea Harriers currently provide?
Mr. Laws : I thank my right hon. and learned Friend, but sadly such matters are beyond me. No doubt the Minister will be able to enlighten us about any discussions that took place with EU and NATO allies before the Government took such a fundamental decision.
Other hon. Members have commented on the gaps that will exist in the lines of defence for the fleet and our other various lines of air defence. That is not only because the furthest outline of defence—the Sea Harriers—are proposed to be removed for some years with nothing in their place, but because there will be holes in the missile defence based on the destroyers. Again, the Minister of State for Defence did not reassure us in his letter of 28 February. In explaining the departure of the Sea Harriers, he said:
"The entry into service of the Type 45 destroyer, equipped with the Principal Anti-Air Missile System from 2007 will provide the Royal Navy with a world class maritime area air defence capability."
Not only are we talking about another gap before we can be sure that that capability is in place, but, as other hon. Members have said, no serious individual with even the remotest experience of military matters would
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consider that a missile system based on a destroyer could offer any protection comparable to the types of defence that the Sea Harriers can and have offered.
Mr. Heath : Is not the obvious conclusion that the Government's decision represents, at least in the medium term, a substantial change to the strategy of the Royal Navy and United Kingdom forces? As such, is it not extraordinary that the Government announced that not as a change in strategy, but as either a procurement decision or a decision based on the location of units in the United Kingdom, neither of which does credit to the fundamental decision that has been taken?
Mr. Laws : My hon. Friend is right. It is difficult to deduce the significance of the decision in the press release in which the Ministry of Defence announced it. It merited a more significant statement, so that the matter could be properly debated in the House first.
The hon. Member for Newark mentioned skills, which are important. Over the past few years, aircrew have built up significant experience in air-to-air defence activities. If they no longer engage in those activities and if those skills are not in place for the next few years, we may lose a vital part of our capability. Even if we have new aircraft to fulfil the Sea Harriers' role, it will take some time to acquire the skills that were deployed to such effect in the Falklands conflict.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome mentioned, the decision raises a fundamental question about the Government's approach to defence policy. We understood that the Government wanted to have large carriers in the years ahead—hopefully, shortly after 2012; presumably, they would have not only ground-attack aircraft, but aircraft that could fulfil the Sea Harriers' role. How can the Government take a decision that involves so much expenditure on new aircraft and aircraft carriers that are so fundamental to our future defence needs and argue that we can limp along for the next few years with a couple of much smaller carriers with no serious air defence capability for themselves, the fleet or the ground attack aircraft? This is an important part of air defence policy, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Poole for having raised the issue.
On 29 April, the Minister of State was kind enough to acknowledge in the House that
"There is an associated risk attached to all of this".—[Official Report, 29 April 2002; Vol. 384, c. 660.]
Many hon. Members have concluded that the Government are taking not only a risk, but a serious gamble with their defence policy, and with the lives and security of the servicemen whom we ask to do important jobs on our behalf.
10.32 am
Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) for obtaining this debate on such an important subject. We have expressed the serious concern felt in this Chamber and by many well informed members of the defence community with little, if any, party political point scoring.
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I agree with the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Laws) that we have not had much of a debate so far. I will be brief, so that the lonely Minister can express his and the Government's thinking. It is disappointing that the Government have been so unwilling to engage in the debate. This morning's Daily Telegraph reported that it sought to publish the Government's point of view, but that Ministers declined to be interviewed. What sort of open government is that? The Government have an obligation to be braver and to explain more. It is an insult not to me, but to the Royal Navy and the services that the Secretary of State for Defence is meant to represent that he will not engage in the debate.
Mr. James Gray (North Wiltshire): My hon. Friend might not have heard the comment made twice by the Under-Secretary of State from a sedentary position. The answer to the question, "Where is the Secretary of State?" was, "He's working." That indicates his view that coming to the Chamber to answer this important debate is not work. Is that not a disgraceful attitude?
Mr. Jenkin : I have no animus towards the Under-Secretary of State, but I sent a message through him that I would be taking part in the debate and that I hoped that the Secretary of State would attend. That is why this Chamber exists. [Interruption.] The fact that the Under-Secretary of State is muttering betrays his embarrassment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Dr. Lewis Moonie) : Please do not be so pompous.
Mr. Jenkin : I shall not rise to that insult.
There is emotion attached to the question because the Sea Harrier became such a symbol of British military prowess and expertise during the Falklands conflict. It is worth recalling that 4 May 20 years ago last Saturday was the day that HMS Sheffield was hit by a sea-skimming missile. A year ago tomorrow, it finally sank. That is the price we may find ourselves paying for inadequate fleet air defence. We did not have enough of the previous variant of the Sea Harrier in theatre to provide round-the-clock air defence at that stage of the conflict. We were reliant on ship-based radar, which provided barely more than a minute's warning to manoeuvre craft to a more advantageous position and deploy counter-measures. As Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward subsequently explained, ultimately, HMS Sheffield was out on the edge of the defence perimeter to act as a sacrificial decoy, to save the more important ships of the taskforce. We might find ourselves in that position again because of the decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier FA2s from 2004 onwards.
The debate is not about the past or about emotion; we must engage constructively to ensure that we understand why the Government have made their decision. As we have heard from all hon. Members participating in the debate, that decision not only potentially puts the lives of our servicemen at risk and imperils the operational capability of the British Navy, but it is a militarily illiterate decision in the context of the expeditionary concept of warfare set out in the SDR and in "Options for Change" under the Conservative Government. The purpose of the Government's
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supposedly foreign policy-led defence policy is to be able to deploy a battle group with the full spread of high-intensity warfare capability to fight medium-sized wars in any corner of the world. Without comprehensive air cover, that capability will no longer exist.