Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate): Occasionally, the MOD throws up a decision that is so bizarre or so illiterate, as the shadow Secretary of State described the decision this morning on the radio, that some analysis has to be carried out to ascertain how it could possibly have reached such a conclusion. Inevitably, we find that the dead hand of the Treasury sits behind the reason why the MOD has reached an extremely strange conclusion.
I take issue with one point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, South (Richard Ottaway). He said that he would not want to be in the Minister's shoes if and when Royal Navy sailors incur the decision's potentially awful consequences. By the time the decision comes into effect, the Minister will be long gone—being, in Sir Robin Day's famous words, "A here today, gone tomorrow Minister", as all Ministers are. It is likely that the Minister who will carry the can at that stage is sitting on the Benches alongside my hon. Friend. I therefore hope that the MOD will review the decision, but not merely in the interests of one of my hon. Friends, who may have responsibility for the matter in future.
The decision is important because the consequences at some point down the line are potentially catastrophic. The MOD is making a decision now that will have an effect in 12 or 14 years' time. The analysis that it has advanced in support of the decision not to upgrade the FA2s and to keep them in service until the joint strike fighter comes on line does not bear scrutiny. The risks that the Ministry is taking, such as those associated with PAAMS and the difficulty of bringing such technology into service on time, are far too great. The MOD's claim that the type 45s will be delivered on time and in sufficient numbers to cover the gap left by the FA2s does not bear analysis either.
In its 1998 strategic defence review, the MOD confirmed the decision taken by the previous Conservative Government and announced in the 1997 general election manifesto to replace existing carriers with new ones. It was an expensive decision, and the necessary investment must be behind it if it is to be delivered. I speak as a veteran of three long-term costings rounds, in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Mr. Deputy Speaker, you will remember from your service on the Select Committee on Defence that at that time the defence budget was under significant pressure. Money is the reason why the MOD has come up with a decision that flies in the face of the overall strategy of the SDR and violates the principles of the entire direction of British defence policy as set out in 1998. The Ministry is plainly scratching round within each area of its budget for savings to meet the budget line.
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The whole LTC process is always an effort to get a quart into pint pot, and it occasionally throws up painful decisions. Perhaps this is a case of royal yachting gone wrong. To those hon. Members who are not familiar with royal yachting, I should explain that when the Navy was asked for cuts, the first thing it offered was the royal yacht. It knew that as long as there was a Conservative Secretary of State for Defence, there was no question of the royal yacht being taken as a defence cut. Eventually that strategy became discredited, but it did not stop the Navy continuing with it from time to time. I suspect that someone may have made the suggestion about the FA2s in the firm knowledge that as we now have a carrier strategy and as the whole of the MOD's policy is predicated on expeditionary capacity and a proper ability to defend the fleet, there could be no question of taking the FA2s.
Optimistic calculations give us a six-year gap, but the aircraft will start to come out of service in 2004 and will be completely out of service by 2006. The gap will last between six to eight years—and that is an optimistic estimate. There may be problems bringing a new carrier into service. We may have to wait until we know the exact capability and requirements of the new joint strike fighter. The timetable may slip—they always do—and we could be carrying a risk for a wholly unacceptable period.
Those who put this measure in LTC 2002 may have believed that it would never be accepted, yet it has been. The decision may have been taken because of the consequences that the carrier strategy, which I endorse, has for expenditure in other areas. Some painful decisions are having to be taken in the land and air budgets. Perhaps this was an opportunity for a little bit of revenge to be taken inside the MOD. Who knows what happened in the internal MOD debate and exactly what the motivations are of the staff who accepted the measure and allowed it to be put to Ministers? None the less, Ministers must understand that their job is to take decisions, and they are the ones who have to engage with the Treasury to ensure that the defence strategy to which the Government have set their hand will be properly funded.
In the light of the decision on the FA2s, one has to conclude that the Government are not prepared to invest properly in the defence policy that they have announced and to which they have committed the country. It cannot be right for the Government to accept the appalling risk created by the length of time that the Royal Navy will be without a proper air-to-air capability that would enable it to act, if necessary on its own, in circumstances that it is impossible to predict, in the next decade and beyond. The decision vividly illustrates the fact that the Ministry of Defence appears to have lost its debate with the Treasury about securing proper funding for the 1998 strategic defence review and the new chapter.
The Government must collectively reconsider. The Secretary of State for Defence must make it clear that the position is unacceptable and that he must have a properly funded defence strategy. If the Government will not provide the means, they must re-evaluate their strategy—an uncomfortable conclusion—because there is no point in having a carrier-based, expeditionary strategy to enable the United Kingdom to operate around the world if that strategy is not properly funded
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and equipped. We are conning ourselves about our ability to sustain that strategy if we are not willing to give the means to support it. Our servicemen will pay the price, and that is unacceptable.
10.21 am
Mr. David Laws (Yeovil): I am grateful for the opportunity to take part in this important debate, and I add my thanks to the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) for having raised the subject. All our defence debates are important, but some are more important than others, and this debate addresses one of the biggest issues that has arisen in defence policy since the election—and perhaps for considerably longer than that. We are talking about losing for years not merely a small portion of our capability in a particular defence area, but our entire capability in that area.
The case for the prosecution has been made effectively in the speeches by the hon. Members for Poole, for Croydon, South (Richard Ottaway), for Newark (Patrick Mercer), for Reigate (Mr. Blunt), and for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Prisk) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). However, from the perspective of actually having a debate, it is a pity that we have not heard the other side of the argument, because that would have made it possible for us to engage more fully with the points that we will hear shortly from the Minister.
I take particular pleasure in being able to take part in the debate because of the proximity of the Yeovilton air base to my constituency. As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome said, when we are both swept back into power after the next election, we may find that boundary changes make the Yeovilton air base part of my constituency.
The main arguments have already been thoroughly covered, but I wish to raise several points. The one common factor in all our debates on defence is the need for our forces to retain flexibility, so that we can respond to all the different challenges we face in this post-cold war era, wherein we do not know where the next threats will come from. In the 1970s, many people considered it unlikely that we would fight a campaign such as the one we fought in the Falklands in the early 1980s. The Sea Harrier was vital to our success in that campaign—indeed, it is difficult to imagine how we could have won that war without the contribution of the Sea Harrier. None of us are in a position to know whether we will have to fight similar campaigns in future, and the Government are making a serious mistake if they base their policy on the experiences of recent times.
On 28 February, the Minister of State for Defence sent a letter to my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch)—and, no doubt, to the Conservative defence spokesman—that explained the reasons for taking the decision. The Minister wrote:
"The SDR emphasised the requirement for increased carrier-based offensive air-power. This has been borne out by operations in recent years in which it has been the ground attack capabilities of the Harrier GR7 that we have needed most on our carriers."
That may be so, but the Minister was wrong to imply that because that has been the experience of recent years, it will remain the experience in the future.