Have the Government accepted a curtailment of the capacity of the expeditionary strategy during the interim period? How soon will we have firm proposals for the marinisation of the joint strike fighter, and at what stage will firm design proposals for the new carriers be possible? What will happen to our existing carriers in the interim—at what stage will one or both of the operational carriers be taken out of service? Do those carriers have the capacity to convert to rotary wing use, which would enhance our amphibious capacity and might supplement HMS Ocean, which is one of the most important elements of the strategy.
Is it clear that the contribution made by naval air capacity is crucial to the future defence of this country and to the deployment further afield that the Government clearly want to use and have used frequently in the past few years? If so, are they willing to put in the investment that will make the means equal to the ends?
9.56 am
Mr. Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford): I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) on securing such a timely debate. I declare an interest in that two members of my family are serving officers in the Royal Navy.
The Government's on-the-hoof decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier is bad for both the Navy and its personnel. I contend that it reduces the capability of the joint force Harrier. Most significantly and, as highlighted by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), it will undermine the pivotal role of the Royal Navy in the future defence of this country and its role in an expeditionary force.
The Sea Harrier has served this country well. The original version was at the heart of the naval campaign in the Falklands, where, even shorn of its current capabilities, it showed its defensive strength on several occasions. Since then, the Sea Harrier has been radically upgraded. Only three or four years ago, at the time of the strategic defence review, it was clearly intended by the Government to be the provider of air defence for the Royal Navy all the way through to 2012. All the documentation and information that the Royal Navy has published clearly supports that intention, so the last-minute decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier 10 years earlier than was previously anticipated seems peculiar.
What is the reason? Ministers say, "Well, the aircraft is ageing," but we are discussing the FA2, which only began service in approximately 1993—indeed, one of those aeroplanes was delivered only three years ago, in 1999. It is not an ageing aircraft. If it were, Ministers might be less able to sell it to other countries. We are told that the engine will not be able to cope with the heat, yet it has served in Sierra Leone and the Gulf. It is said, "Well, don't worry because the Harrier GR7 and GR9 will replace it," but those aircraft are designed specifically as a ground attack plane—a specific and different purpose. To replace a defensive aircraft with a ground attack aircraft is like trying to replace a shield with a spear. They are inherently different in their function and, operationally, such a replacement makes no sense.
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The unstated reason is, as usual, money. As my hon. Friend the Member for Poole pointed out, in practical terms, the Royal Navy will be left without a defensive fixed-wing aircraft for at least six years—and probably 10 years. We all accept that air defence should be provided in layers, the first and most important of which is the Sea Harrier; therefore to remove that layer will inevitably increase the risk to our ships and service personnel. I understand that the Minister of State for Defence has already accepted that possibility, but I ask the Minister present today whether he believes that our service personnel should have to accept such a risk. After all, it is their safety on the line, not his.
Another argument put forward by the Government is that the type 45 destroyer will fill the gap. That is to overlook the tiny detail that one is a ship and the other is a subsonic aircraft. There are other problems. The type 45 does not have the Sea Harrier's over-the-horizon radar and, as we heard earlier, there will not be sufficient numbers to provide complete cover in any realistic sense until at least 2010. Also, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome rightly pointed out, the much vaunted PAAMS missile system is still in a box and has yet to be tested. We do not know whether it will work: it may be superb, but it may fail. That is the risk that Ministers are taking.
Perhaps the most ironic result of the decision to scrap Sea Harriers is that the capability of joint force Harrier will be set back, because, as we have heard, Sea Harrier has the Blue Vixen radar and GR7/9 does not. Therefore, joint force Harrier will now have to rely on the one aircraft that does not have that radar. That is a retrograde step and although I appreciate that the Minister is not directly responsible for the decision, I hope that he will confirm that in his reply.
The Government's on-the-hoof decision will undermine the Navy's expeditionary role—a critical role that lies at the heart of the whole characteristic of the strategic defence review. All expeditionary sea forces need air defence—ask any Falklands veteran. Even 20 years ago, the Sea Harrier was able to take out 28 Argentine aircraft for the loss of only two of our own in combat. Sea Harrier is essential to any task force or similar naval operation.