Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): Order. With such demand, brevity will be our friend.
9.42 am
Richard Ottaway (Croydon, South): First, let me pick up on the final remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Syms). Once, as the British fleet closed on the American fleet, the Americans signalled to the British fleet, "How's the world's second largest navy?" The Royal Navy replied, "Fine. How's the second best?"
I had the privilege to serve in the Fleet Air Arm in the 1960s. I was a fighter controller, carried on board HMS Eagle and operating out of Royal Naval air station Yeovilton. It was a time of great tension: Russian aircraft would constantly overfly the fleet. We operated primarily in the north Atlantic, off the coast of Norway, and in the Mediterranean. I had the privilege of being on board HMS Eagle when the first vertical take-off aircraft landed. The Kestrel was the forerunner of the Harrier, and it became obvious to those of us involved in defence of the fleet that it was an integral part of Britain's defence system. I was also involved in the trials of the Phantom, which was the backbone of the Fleet Air Arm throughout the 1970s and 1980s. HMS Eagle carried a fleet of Sea Vixens of 899 Squadron, which were the backbone of the air defence capability of the Fleet Air Arm. Those aircraft were flown in combat air patrols over the fleet, in a manner that was described admirably by my hon. Friend the Member for Poole, in an air defence capacity.
It is unthinkable that British amphibious forces could be deployed in a modern theatre without air cover—it is an essential ingredient of modern warfare. I can understand how the problem has arisen. The new carriers are predicted to come into service in 2012, but I guess that it will be 2015 or even later. There will potentially be an eight, nine or 10-year gap in the fleet.
The FA2 is a fantastic aircraft: it carries a tremendous weapons system and good radar. One difficulty is that it is getting old; another is that it is designed to operate in the north Atlantic, not in hot weather conditions such as the Indian ocean and the Gulf. It is unable to land if it is still carrying a heavy load of unused missiles, and the only alternative is to dump the missiles, which is a bit like dumping a Rolls-Royce every time the aircraft comes in to land. It differs from the GR7, which is bigger, lighter and made of more modern fibres than the heavy FA2. More recently, the FA2 has effectively ridden as shotgun for GR7 bombers, for example in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The solution is to upgrade the FA2 and fit a modern engine, but the Government have chosen not to do so. I assume that the reasons for that are budgetary, but there are only 17 FA2s: is it really worth sacrificing the essential air defence cover of our amphibious forces because there is a lack of cash to upgrade the engines of 17 aircraft? It is a big risk, and the Government are seriously exposing themselves with the decision.
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The second world war was won as a result of air superiority, and HMS Sheffield was lost due to a lack of air superiority. In the Gulf war, the position was never tested, but I am sure that the Americans would not have gone to the Gulf had they not had air defence cover.
Mr. Francois : There is an old naval saying about spoiling a ship for a ha'p'orth of tar. Is this decision not a modern variant?
Richard Ottaway : My hon. Friend is right. It is such a bad decision for a modest budgetary sum, which is why it baffles me.
The Government say that the answer is to upgrade the missile defence system and have spoken about the introduction of the type 45s and new PAAMS air defence system. However, the world is an uncertain place. Who would have thought 12 months ago that the Marines would be deployed in Afghanistan today? We have no idea where future threats will come from. We are highly vulnerable in many theatres, and the Government's decision will put at risk the lives of many men and women who serve the interests of this country.
Equally seriously, the Minister will be putting at risk major warships at the centre of our amphibious fleet. The potential to lose a ship is dramatically increased in the event of a missile attack on the fleet, and the result would be catastrophic. The Exocet that sunk HMS Sheffield is now out of date, but just as British and European technology has advanced, so too has other technology. Missiles now have all the capability in the world.
I have three questions. First, how good does the Minister think PAAMS, which is, unfortunately, a French system, will be on the type 45, and how much cover will it give to our amphibious forces? Secondly, what are his proposals for airborne early warning radar cover of the fleet? Thirdly, how do the Government intend to fill the gap I have mentioned?
If there are no clear answers, the consequences will be profound. If the fleet is lost as a result, I would not like to be in the Minister's shoes when he faces the House to explain the decision. Defence is the most basic function of Government, and a strong defence is the surest way to peace. By this decision, the Minister has put that status at risk, and he will be held to account if he gets it wrong.
9.49 am
Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome): I, too, congratulate the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) on securing the debate. It is a great pleasure for me to take part, because I represent the constituency that contains Yeovilton, where much of the Fleet Air Arm is based—although if the boundary commission has its way, it will be moved to the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Laws). I would consider that a great loss.
We are proud of the Fleet Air Arm, which is the oldest air service in this country. We are proud of both its history and its future capabilities. I am pleased that the Government have recognised that capability in some of their recent decisions, but the decision on the Harriers has rightly caused some consternation, not least because of the personal issues associated with the crew and
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families at Yeovilton, who have faced considerable disruption in the past year or so. First, they were told that they were to leave Somerset for what I was criticised in the papers for calling "the wilderness of Lincolnshire". I withdraw that comment unreservedly. I am sure that Lincolnshire is a delightful place, but it is not where the crew and their families want to live, having built their lives in Somerset. They have faced considerable uncertainty. They have made career and family decisions based on a decision that was subsequently rescinded. It is regrettable that the information on which so a recent a decision was based has in a short time changed so much that the decision has been reversed.
Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the point. The fact that the Government were planning to transfer the Sea Harriers to Lincolnshire underlines the short-term nature of their decision. It was not the intended decision; they made it under budgetary pressures in the short term. It was originally intended to extend the life of the Sea Harriers and deploy them from Lincolnshire.
Mr. Heath : The hon. Gentleman pre-empts my point. This is an example of the Ministry's short-term thinking, which is difficult to defend to the people involved, however grateful I am to see a continuation of their presence in Somerset in years to come.
The hon. Member for Poole raised the wider issue that the decision strikes at the heart of the expeditionary strategy, which was the basis of the strategic defence review. I welcomed the development of the strategy, which puts amphibious operations at the heart of the future capabilities of the British armed forces, treats the Navy as a crucial element of that capacity, and envisages the amphibious taskforce as a basic unit of deployment in the Navy. However, if that strategy is to be successful, the decision on the Sea Harriers leaves many questions, because it leaves an amphibious force no air-to-air capacity and no forward detection capability beyond the horizon offered by rotary aircraft above the taskforce. The decision suggests that the Ministry has taken the view that within the relevant period an amphibious taskforce can and will be deployed only in the context of littoral warfare, and only with support from America or other navies that still enjoy air-to-air capacity.
Although I understand that rationale, it begs the question what happens in the case of the unexpected and the unknowable. To what extent is an expeditionary strategy constrained by that lack of capacity? As we have heard, eventually we will have type 45s, which will provide missile defence in the form of PAAMS, but that is an untried system, and as a replacement it will need to work from day one.
The second strand of replacement is the joint strike fighter, but there are questions about the JSF's design and how far advanced its marinisation is. There is a conundrum: the Government have announced that they want to have two carriers, but they cannot be designed until we know the form of the aircraft that will fly from those carriers. The whole process is held up while we wait for the Americans to work on the marinisation of the JSF.
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