Some politics
Mr. Robert Syms (Poole): The focus of today's debate is the Ministry of Defence's decision, announced on 28 February, to axe the Royal Navy Sea Harrier units from the beginning of 2004; service will end by 2006. The decision is of great concern to the Opposition as it affects the Royal Navy and the future of this country's defence. Even the Minister of State for Defence, who was involved in the decision, pointed out:
"There is an associated risk attached to all of this, but it is without question a decision based on the balance of investment. We believe it to be an entirely logical step".—[Official Report, 29 April 2002; Vol. 384, c. 660.]
We will point out the flaws in the decision during the debate, I hope that the Minister will not only respond, but reconsider this short-sighted policy.
In 1998, the Government conducted their strategic defence review and decided to restructure the Harrier forces in the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Air Force.
Mr. Mark Francois (Rayleigh): Will my hon. Friend comment on two related points? First, although we are discussing a matter of great importance to the defence of the fleet and therefore to the defence of the realm, no Labour Back Bencher is present. Secondly, without intending any disrespect to the Under-Secretary of State, for whom I have a considerable amount of time, I have to say that it is disrespectful of the Secretary of State for Defence not to be present in Westminster Hall this morning to discuss such an important matter.
Mr. Syms : I make no comment about the Government: people can make up their own mind about the Government's priorities. However, I draw attention to my hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, who is answering the debate for the Opposition. I welcome his contribution, as it proves what importance the Conservative party attach to the issue.
The 1998 strategic defence review proposed a joint force of the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force. The Opposition were not against that because there is logic in it, but we are concerned that already, only two years later, the Government are changing the shape of the defence forces proposed in the review, and the decision will reduce the flexibility of the Royal Navy. Between 2006 and the introduction into service of the new aircraft carriers between 2012 and 2015, there will be a major gap in air defence of our fleet. The Opposition regard that with great concern. A key lesson of modern defence is that air superiority is vital to our armed services, so it is a serious matter to give up air superiority of our fleet.
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The United Kingdom's Sea Harrier is a capable fighter aircraft. We all remember its vital role in defending the fleet from air attack during the Falklands war. In 1982, the Sea Harrier destroyed 28 of the 100 enemy aircraft destroyed; more importantly, United States Air Force analysts said that it deterred 453 further attacks on the fleet. Without it, that enterprise would not have been successful. In 1996, Commander Richard Dawkins—Commander Air for the Fleet Air Arm—said:
"the F/A2 is the best air-defence aircraft in Europe".
It is therefore important to keep the aircraft as part of our armoury to protect our fleet.
Many members of the press have expressed concern about the decision. In March 2002, the much respected Jane's Defence Weekly commented:
"Withdrawal of Sea Harrier FA2, equipped with the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile will . . . represent a significant diminution of the RN's fleet defence capability. Whereas the FA2 is equipped with the Blue Vixen multi-mode radar, the GR7/GR9 lacks a radar and is only equipped with short range air-to-air weapons for self-defence."
That is a critical point. There has just been a major refit of the FA2s. In 1985, work began on a mid-life update of the Sea Harrier fleet. Finished only in 1996, the programme cost Ł466 million. We can stretch the life of the aircraft to give our fleet substantial protection.
Why have the Government changed their policy and what are their motives? Is it money? The overall cost of keeping the Sea Harriers would represent good, not bad value for the taxpayer. The Government claim that the move will save Ł109 million between 2002–03 and 2005–06, but if it impedes the flexibility of naval forces and does not provide protection for carriers, it is a short-sighted economy. The replacement of the Harrier GR7 with the upgraded GR9 means no stand-off weapons capability, as the aircraft will not be equipped with an appropriate gun. The arms it possesses will give it an over-the-target capability, but, as we all know, it is difficult to deliver that payload when the enemy state has an air defence system.
It is important that the fleet has a layered defence. Sea Harriers provide the outer layer, patrolling perhaps 100 nautical miles around the fleet's exterior. Because radar can see down and jet fighters can cover hundreds of square miles, they provide the outer protection. The key to protecting the fleet is to see off any potential threat before it becomes a real threat to our ships, and that involves deterring as well as shooting down. The problem with relying on the type 45 for missile defence is that the moment an aircraft comes within the range of our missiles, we are within the range of its missiles. That puts our fleet in great danger.
We all know that Britain has been involved in several areas of tension, albeit not clear-cut war. Our fleet may be stationed off the coast of a nation over which the west is in dispute. I can readily imagine a rogue state sending jet fighters to threaten our fleet, and presenting our fleet commander with a difficult choice—to take an aircraft out, or allow it to come close enough to launch its missiles, which could result in the loss of a ship. That choice would not arise with Sea Harriers protecting the fleet, because of their great reach.
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I remain deeply concerned about the change. The Government place great emphasis on the type 45, but the fact remains that by 2010 to 2012, we shall have only three type 45s. The missile for which we all have great hopes—the principal anti-air-missile system—will certainly be superior to the Sea Dart, but to provide high-level protection it will have to act at the height of its capability from day one, straight out of the box, and we know that high technology does not always work like that. I am worried that we are giving away an air superiority fighter that would have provided protection for the fleet, and instead relying on missile defence when we may not have sufficient ships or sufficient missiles to make it work for our fleet in areas of significant risk.
The Government have spoken about significant technical difficulties, such as problems with the Harrier and Sea Harrier in hot climates, which can affect the power of the engines, but the Harrier's record shows that it has served all over the world, including the middle east and off Sierra Leone, so I see no reason not to continue its service. Even with a slight diminution of capability, it remains a capable air defence fighter for protecting our fleet. Off the coast of Sierra Leone, the Sea Harrier was used for patrolling and bombing missions on the mainland in preference to the Army version. Its radar enables it to find the ship, which the Army version cannot do.
Incidentally, a hardy aircraft is required to serve in a maritime environment. The Sea Harrier has anti-corrosive treatment to enable it to serve in that environment, whereas adapting the proposed GR9 to ensure that it can serve on land and off aircraft carriers might involve quite expensive treatment.
My principal concern is that getting rid of the Sea Harrier will make us heavily reliant on other forces if we were to deploy in the air defence of a British battle group. We would have to rely on US carrier protection, which immediately inhibits what we can do. The French are also a possibility, because they have an aircraft carrier and air superiority forces; perhaps India is, too. Perhaps if we had to sell the aircraft to India, we could do a deal whereby the Indians protect the Royal Navy. The Government's policy decision leads us to all those conclusions.
I am genuinely concerned because the Sea Harrier is a proven aircraft. Admittedly, it is slowly becoming obsolescent, but all military kit becomes obsolescent. There is a substantial difference between keeping an aircraft that is ageing but can perform a role, and getting rid of it entirely and having no aircraft to perform that role. Our fleet needs protection: the added security of an air defence fighter in the form of the Sea Harrier is vital to ensure the maximum flexibility of the armed services.
I hope that the Government will reconsider carefully the arguments being advanced from all quarters, including the Opposition. The policy decision will substantially inhibit the Government's strategic outlook. It will be a sad day in the future when the Royal Navy can deploy a battle group only by agreement with other countries. The Royal Navy has always been the third navy in the world and a blue-water navy that can deploy around the world. I believe that, at least in the
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interim before the future aircraft carriers are introduced, the Navy will not be able to perform the tasks that the Government continually give it.