Re-word (attempt)
I will try again on the important issues ... forgive me for not being fluent in English
1. Wet RWY is often extremely slippery at UIO, worse than the Landing distance calculations assume (mu-story), due heavy and extensive rubber deposits (often in combination with oil after a period of dry weather). Some companies have refused to fly into UIO unless the RWY was going to be grooved (after experiencing a few scary moments; it is no pleasure having your cockpit hanging over the end lights after landing). When was the last time the RWY was grooved (report does not say)? Was a “slippery when wet” NOTAM issued/warranted (and what is the company advise i.c.o.)? IMHO normal calculations for wet runways at UIO tend to be overly optimistic and incorrectly pretend it is an exact science (hence the “136 meters” in the report); it is not.
2. The published Decision Altitude is not realistic for aircraft like the A346; due to the construction of the approach (forced and necessary “duck under” to pick up the PAPI due to the displaced glide slope antenna – see approach plate) it is practically impossible to arrive over the threshold in a stabilized way from your DA. The captain managed -where many would probably have not– however resulting in an unstabilized approach. Why does the state allow unrealistic minima for Cat-C/D aircraft; why did the company not impose higher limits or at least put out a warning (even after several warnings of its crews, other companies did). The crew may be to blame, but where do other parties fit in?
3. Although the aircraft landed hard and some tires did burst, the aircraft was basically still intact. The problem was that the air-ground logic malfunctioned and from that moment on the airplane was going to crash – no escape possible. Approach (!) idle forward thrust i.s.o. reverse thrust (could not get it into reverse due failed air-ground logic) does not help the already poor braking action of the wheelbrakes (incl. the burst tires). Basically the increased forward thrust negated most of the braking of the wheels. Failure of the air-ground logic was a major contributing factor to the crash. Why does air-ground logic fail after a hard landing/tire burst? Should this not have been designed with a backup mode? What in case of an RTO due to a tire failure? Airbus/Certification authorities?
4. Only after 3 seconds the crew started manual braking, traveling over 300 meters before any braking occurred. Assuming the hard landing “warranted” an autobrake failure, how many seconds does it take for the crew to react? I don’t think 3 seconds is very long (especially after a hard landing in the given conditions), but where does it fit into your calculations? I have seen autobrakes fail upon touchdown for far less a reason, but is using a –potentially failing- autobrake system in such a critical situation the best option (given the extra time and landing distance i.c.o. failure)? Should extra time be added for using the autobrake system: for the failure to be displayed, for the crew to recognize this failure and for the crew to react (a bit like the V1-RTO times). 136 meters gives you only 1.3 seconds, not 3 seconds; 1.3 seconds is probably not even enough for the warning to appear. Certification authorities, (company) safety margins?
The report does not address these (political/sensitive) issues.
Hope I made myself clearer.