Pennies...
Having flown into UIO quite a few times (albeit other Company and Plane-about same size, forgive me if aircraft specifics are misinterpreted), tailwind at UIO35 is not unusual. Besides, the alternative –a circling (actually visual) for 17- was no option due to the weather (vis 3000 meters).
One of the things that might have been considered in the pre-landing phase is the braking action at UIO when experiencing wet runway conditions. (A.o. due to the high GS at UIO) a lot of rubber deposit can be found in the touchdown zone’s; extended touchdown zone’s due to the normal & displaced threshold 35, and the frequently inaccurate touchdown positions (both 17 and 35). When was the last time the RWY was grooved (report does not say)? If not recent the effective braking surface will probably not be very long (a few hundred meters in the middle). Combined with possibly remaining oil deposits on the RWY this can be quite hairy at UIO. Since friction meters in cars are not reliable under these conditions, the only thing you have is pilot reports and experience. Braking action is hardly an exact science, however in this case .. ‘poor’ (mu≈0.2 or lower) is far lower than normal mu≈0.4 (ba=’good’) for ‘normal’ wet runways (as used in the landing distance calculations). Reported ba ‘poor’ might have to generate even greater warning flags with the cockpit crew than it did, especially if you have been there a few times.
The proper -2020 hindsight- alternative for the crew in the pre-landing phase would have been to divert. However, that is not a very popular concept–company, passengers, attendants- if the data indicates a safe landing can be made and pilot reports are often inaccurate. I understand the decision to start the approach for UIO-35.
The UIO ILS/Visual 35 approach itself is challenging, especially with vis 3000 meters. Due to the terrain (hill) in front of the RWY, the GS is (500 meters) displaced leaving insufficient LDA for large aircraft. Therefore a PAPI is placed at the normal landing position, which flightpath you will pick up after passing the hill (with a VOR-QMS conveniently placed on top). With 3000 meters of visibility you will have the Runway on the ILS at approx DA. Normally –in good conditions- you will leave the ILS-GP to intercept the visual GP at or around QMS (about 4-4.5 NM out), now as I understand from the report –due vis- at DA (about 1.6 NM out). This, in order to pick up the PAPI from this position, requires an impressive sinkrate (more than 1500’/min), while being stabilized at 500’ GND has become impossible (more likely at 200’ at the earliest). Quite likely some interesting sinkrate warnings have added to the party. With that one may question this DA for larger aircraft like the A346; fine for the small aircraft, but far too low for these aircraft/procedure. No company advise had apparently been given on this situation.
UIO is famous for its hard landings: high groundspeed; challenging ILS/Visual approach procedure; high elevation (flare slightly higher); and last but not least the upslope of RWY 35. Even in perfect weather conditions a challenge. So, from this fairly unstabilized position in –for this airport- very limited visibilities it is now time to flare. This pilot knew he only had very few (136m as they later determined) meters of ‘extra’ runway on top of the certified touchdown point; not a lot and far less than the normal touchdown-zone. So, he minimized the flare. UIO RWY 35 unfortunately has a significant upslope in the touchdown zone; total upslope of RWY 35 may be limited (0.4%) but due to the “bump” in the runway actual upslope may be as much as 0.8% (if I recall correctly) in the touchdown zone. Add that to the 1100’/min VS (not abnormal for the 3 deg final app itself) upon touchdown, and one might give the A346 a bit of credit for not breaking up altogether. But then again, should an aircraft brake down from a “unflared” landing from a 3 degrees flightpath? Did you never “forget” to flare or flared “too late” (mostly aggravating the situation since the main gear is aft of the CG). I did .. a few times .. fortunately not at UIO (knock on wood).
Normally the bulk of the braking action comes from the wheelbrakes, however with braking action ‘poor’ (contaminated) the speedbrakes/liftdumpers (WOW) and reversers become ever more important. Autobrakes indicated defective upon the hard landing causing wheelbraking to be delayed by 3 seconds and eating up valuable runway before manual braking started (especially at UIO- groundspeeds). Upon landing deployment of the reversers was blocked by computer logic (air-ground sensors); there goes a major portion (up to 30-35%) of your total braking action, especially at high speeds. Add to this not only ground idle forward thrust, but approach idle and your braking action is further reduced. From the moment these systems failed this aircraft was doomed. Why did these systems fail; what happens with an RTO due to a tire failure during take off? Airbus computers help right upto the point that you really need them? Food for thought.
Yes, a lousy landing, but that's about it.
My two pennies worth...