You can argue about which lighting set-up is better/airworthy until the cows come home to roost, but the simple fact is, most of us in that position would have had a light off. As eluded to in earlier posts, this was one of those tragic accidents - but no more than that.
As you say, it seems obvious there are occasions when the light(s) must be off. The point made by the BoI was that, because other defences in depth (against the risk of collision) were missing, the final defence (lights) became even more crucial. This was exacerbated by the remaining light being "dim" and "wooded", leading to disorientation. These are the BoI's words, not mine.
If the BoI are to be criticised it is that they don't spell out all these issues, or explore the background. They came to the logical conclusion that the HISL installation, as fitted and used within that aircraft and system of systems, was unfit for purpose. Compare their trials results with the requirements of Def Stan 00-970 (which they quoted verbatim), and they could come to no other conclsuion. Perhaps, if the other defences had been available, they would not have been so hard on HISL, but the fact remains they were missing and that should have flagged serious problems in the Safety Case (which one assumes was updated when HISL was introduced into the AEW Mk2 in 1997?).
I see this problem all the time in procurement. In the same way the report is written with a target audience in mind, whom the Board assume understand implicitly the background detail, so too are airworthiness standards written for the use of staff who understand each nuance from long experience. But, that experience, competence and corporate knowledge (all crucial components of airworthiness) are missing (see Gray and Haddon-Cave), the position today being inexperienced staffs are taught Def Stans are not mandatory; so they routinely ignore them. The problem is, they are not taught the next sentence; that if you ignore one standard you MUST invoke another.
So, when you say;
I'm certain the RN have examined how to launch/recover cabs with slightly more coordination.
is this not an implicit acknowledgment that the regulations governing interoperability and systems of systems integration were, it appears, not followed? (I'm sure you are correct!). It is an obvious area to investigate on a programme that changed the designation to ASaC Mk7. One obvious reason for doing that is change of use and function, so it would make sense to investigate the impact of that change with those who use it. For example, ships, to ensure their procedures are still suitable for the new aircraft and the way it must operate. The regulations demand it. The BoI does explore this, but much is redacted. But their conclusions make it clear that there were serious failings in this area.
So, in answer to a previous question, yes, in my opinion this case is entirely linked to the Gray and Haddon-Cave reports.